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Phishing emails present a threat to both personal and organizational data. Phishing is a
cyber-attack using social engineering. About 94% of cybersecurity incidents are due to
phishing and/or social engineering. A significant volume of prior literature documented
that users are continuing to click on phishing links in emails, even after phishing
awareness training. It appears there is a strong need for creative ways to alert and warn
users to signs of phishing in emails.
The main goal of the experiments in this study was to measure participants’ time for
recognizing signs of phishing in emails, thus, reducing susceptibility to phishing in
emails on mobile devices. This study included three phases. The first phase included 32
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) that provided feedback on the top signs of phishing in
emails, audio/visual/haptic pairings with the signs of phishing, and developmental
constructs toward a phishing alert and warning system. The second phase included a pilot
study with five participants to validate a phishing alert and warning system prototype.
The third phase included delivery of the Phishing Alert and Warning System, (PAWS
Mobile App ™) with 205 participants.
The results of the first phase aligned the constructs for the alert and warning system. A
female voice-over warning was chosen by the SMEs as well as visual icon alerts for the
top signs of phishing in emails. This study designed, developed, as well as empirically
tested the PAWS Mobile App, that alerted and warned participants to the signs of
phishing in emails on mobile devices. PAWS displayed a randomized series of 20
simulated emails to participants with varying displays of either no alerts and warnings, or
a combination of alerts and warnings. The results indicated audio alerts and visual
warnings potentially lower phishing susceptibility in emails. Audio and visual warnings
appeared to have assisted the study participants in noticing phishing emails more easily,
and in less time than without audio and visual warnings. The results of this study also
indicated alerts and warnings assisted participants in noticing distinct signs of phishing in
the simulated phishing emails viewed. This study implicates phishing email alerts and
warnings applied and configured to email applications may play a significant role in the
reduction of phishing susceptibility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
According to Clement (2018), the volume of email users has grown to more than
3.8 billion and is projected to reach 4.3 billion by the year 2022. Email remains the most
pervasive form of communication, while other technologies such as social networking,
Instant Messaging (IM), chat, mobile IM, and others are also taking hold, email is still the
most ubiquitous form of business communication (Clement, 2018). In addition, email is
integral to the overall Internet experience as an email account (i.e. email address) is
required to sign up to most online activities, including social networking sites, IM, and
any other kind of account or presence on the Internet. In 2018, the total number of
professional emails sent and received per day exceed 281 billion and is forecast to grow
to over 333 billion by yearend 2022 (Radicati Group, 2018). Over the past two decades,
email became an essential part of personal and business communication (Clement, 2018).
It is estimated that 72% of users check their email via mobile smartphone, and 19% of
users check email as soon as they arrive to work (Clement, 2018). However, users are
still falling for signs of phishing in emails (Wash & Cooper, 2018) and collectively
costing themselves and their employers millions of dollars annually.
Phishing and social engineering attacks target more than 37.3 million people per
year, and costs organizations an average of $3.7 million annually (Abass, 2018). Phishing
and social engineering encompass approximately 93% of information security incidents
(Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2018). Also defined as an email spam message, phishing
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emails continue to present a significant threat to both personal and corporate data loss,
even after phishing awareness training (Almomani et al., 2013; Carlton et al., 2018).
Thus, it appears that there is a strong need for creative ways to warn and alert users to
signs of phishing in emails.
Problem Statement
The overarching research problem this study addressed is the significant volume
of users who continue to click on phishing links in emails, exposing them and/or their
organizations to identity theft, monetary loss, and data loss (Aaron, 2010). Dakpa and
Augustine (2017) defined phishing as one way to obtain sensitive data, usernames,
passwords, and other information from a user to inflict future damage. The Anti-Phishing
Working Group (2018) also described signs of phishing in emails including poor
grammar, sense of urgency in the message, incorrect sender address, and requests for
personal information. Other signs of phishing in emails include incorrect Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) in the email message, unfamiliar or inaccurate logo for a
company, unfamiliar front, incorrect language translation, inconsistent greeting from
common senders to the recipient, a request to update or verify information, an
attachment, or an urgent request for a donation (Austin Technology, 2016).
Phishing is a type of social engineering that is part of cybersecurity (Canfield,
2018; Hernandez et al., 2016). According to the Joint Task Force on Cybersecurity
Education (2017):
“Cybersecurity is a computing-based discipline involving technology, people,
information, and processes to enable assured operations in the context of
adversaries. It draws from the foundational fields of information security and
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information assurance; and began with more narrowly focused field of computer
security.” (p. 16)
Termed as ‘System 2 Thinking Mode’ (S2) Kahneman (2011), describes an
individual in a more aware state that s/he can utilize when making important decisions.
Users have tendency to be more deliberate with their choices in S2, as opposed to
‘System 1 Thinking Mode’ (S1). S1 is more routine and not as deliberate or thoughtful
(Kahneman, 2011). Warning is defined as “something that makes you understand there is
a possible danger or problem, especially one in the future”, and the definition of alert as,
“an alarm or other signal of danger” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2018, p. 30). Alerts
and warnings can be used to trigger S2 (Kahneman, 2011).
Alerts and warnings have been used for several common situations: fire alarms to
alert of smoke, gas, or fire, weather alerts to signal imminent weather danger, and home
intrusion alarms to signal unauthorized access. Alerts and warnings have been used with
several manufacturers to warn drivers of danger in driving situations and have become
universally adopted in all vehicles. Examples of some automotive related warnings and
alerts include loud beeps, blinking lights or icons, and seat or steering wheel vibrations
(Zheng et al., 2004) have been used to obtain a driver’s attention in order to prompt the
driver to a potentially dangerous situation.
Meaningful warning systems reflect specific urgency and prompt the user to pay
attention based on the perception of the severity of the sound, visual prompt, and other
system by the user (Sousa et al., 2016). Specifically, audio alerting should be used when
user safety if most important, and not used for insignificant issues (Sousa et al., 2016).
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The balance between too many alerts, and what the user needs to pay attention to, can be
differentiated by users based on audio, visual, and other techniques (Sousa et al., 2016).
It appears that developing ways to help users make decisions in S2 could be
beneficial. Utilizing S2 could improve users’ ability to recognize, alert, and react
appropriately to phishing attempts. Assisting users to switch to S2 could potentially help
decrease the amount of individual identity theft, Business Email Compromise (BEC), and
corporate data theft through risk of phishing in emails. Through the following literature
synthesis, it appears little attention has been paid in research regarding audio, visual, and
haptic (vibration) warnings in the context of cybersecurity, or more specifically in the
context of alerting and warning users to signs of phishing in emails through
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning combinations.
Dissertation Goal
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and empirically test
the effectiveness (via the measures of (a) ability to notice, & (b) time to notice) of an
audio, visual, and haptic warning system that alerts users to the signs of phishing in
emails on mobile devices. The need for this work was demonstrated by Almomani et al.
(2013), Acquisti (2016), and The Anti-Phishing Working Group (2018). An initial list of
signs of phishing in emails, that are considered the most critical threats, was developed
from published research, and preliminarily identified in the corresponding literature
synthesis. Additionally, libraries of both audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings to
correspond with each of the signs of phishing in emails were developed to use towards
the Phishing Alert Warning System (PAWS) mobile application.
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The first specific goal of this study was to develop and validate, using Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs), the list of the top signs of phishing in emails that are considered
the most critical threats. Frauenstein (2019) indicated that there are certain signs of
phishing in emails that should be more commonly seen by users currently, as well as
certain signs of phishing in emails that are considered more dangerous than others (based
on a high percentage of automated security controls in place to ward off commonly seen
risks). Outcome from the first goal was used to determine the SMEs’ identified and
validated list of the top signs of phishing in emails that are the most critical threats, in
rank order, paired with an audio/visual/haptic alert and warning for the second goal.
Anderson et al. (2013) indicated that polymorphic warnings (beeps, sounds, &
vibrations) can reduce habituation. Axon et al. (2017) indicated that audio warnings are
more effective when appropriately designed for the human ear, pertaining to
cybersecurity warnings. Appropriately matched audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings
for the related signs of phishing in emails is important to examine.
The third and fourth specific goals of this study was to determine the tasks for
measures of (a) ability to notice, and (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails using
SMEs. The SMEs validated measures helped to determine if improvement was made with
or without the assistance of PAWS for the user. The measure of ability to notice is
referred to an individual user’s ability (or lack thereof) to notice if an email has signs of
phishing. The measure of time to notice is referred to the time (in seconds) of an
individual user’s ability to determine if an email has signs of phishing.
The fifth goal of this research was to determine validation and testing procedures
that should be considered to deliver a mobile app phishing alert and warning system
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prototype. The development of valid components of the phishing alert and warning
system utilized SME validated feedback for (a) top signs of phishing in emails in rank
order, (b) SME validated feedback for audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings to pair
with the signs of phishing, (c) characteristics to assess users’ ability to notice and/or time
to notice signs of phishing in emails, (d) based on SMEs’ response, the measure of time
to notice will determine how long (in seconds) users ‘notice signs of phishing in emails.
This research goal included the actual programing and building of the PAWS mobile app
prototype. Testing procedures included capturing the qualitative feedback of prototype
testers, and correcting any significant issues with the mobile app.
The sixth goal of this study was to determine if there are any significant mean
differences among the users’ ability to notice, time to notice, and time to notice signs of
phishing in emails with or without PAWS. The seventh goal of this research study was to
determine if there are any significant mean differences among the users’ ability to notice,
time to notice, and time to notice signs of phishing in emails based on (a) age, (b) gender,
(c) experience with phishing training, and (d) attention span.
Ability to notice that an email has signs of phishing, or poses a significant risk, is
critical to user’s cybersecurity situational awareness (Wash & Cooper, 2018). As
practiced in other fields, such as automotive, audio/visual/haptic warnings are used for
alerting such as fasten seatbelt, lane departure, loss of air pressure, and engine trouble
(Sternlund et al., 2017). The hypothesis is that a user’s time to notice the signs of
phishing in emails may improve if measured first without the use of audio/visual/haptic
warnings, then again with the use of audio/visual/haptic warnings to determine if the user
notices the signs of phishing to start with or faster with the assistance of
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audio/visual/haptic warnings, while also attempting to see if any significant differences
exist base on key demographics indictors as well as audio/visual/haptic alert and warning
combinations.
Sheng et al. (2010) indicated the importance of demographic research in the
context of studying and training specific user groups against risk behavior and phishing
susceptibility. The PAWS Mobile App was configured to determine if there are any mean
differences in the users’ ability to notice, time to notice, and time to notice signs of
phishing in emails using PAWS based on (a) age, (b) gender, (c) experience with
phishing training, as well as (d) attention span. In summary, PAWS was developed using
SME feedback and used to determine if audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings improve a
user’s ability to notice the top signs of phishing in emails more quickly, thus, reducing
phishing susceptibility.
Research Questions
The main Research Question (RQ) that this study addressed was: What
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning system combination can be used to empirically
assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and (b) time to notice phishing in emails on mobile
devices?
RQ1: What are the SMEs’ validated top signs of phishing in emails that are
considered the most critical threats to users?
RQ2: What SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings are most
valid to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails?
RQ3: What are the SMEs’ validated tasks for the measures of: (a) ability to
notice, and (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails?
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RQ4: What is the SMEs’ validated maximum time for users’ ability to notice
signs of phishing in emails?
RQ5: What validation and testing procedures should be considered to deliver a
mobile app phishing alert and warning prototype?
RQ6a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
RQ6b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ time to
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
RQ6c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
RQ7a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b)
gender, (c) experience with phishing training, and (d) attention span?
RQ7b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ time to
notice of phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) gender, (c)
experience with phishing training, as well as (d) attention span?
RQ7b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b)
gender, (c) experience with phishing training, as well as (d) attention span?
Relevance and Significance
Relevance
The relevance of this research study is that it presented a novel way of alerting
users to signs of phishing in emails on mobile devices using audio/visual/haptic
warnings. Past studies have contributed to this issue; however, the problem persists.
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Users are still susceptible to phishing attacks delivered through email (Anti-Phishing
Working Group, 2018). Phishing continues to be a viable social engineering method, and
collectively costs users and businesses millions of dollars on an annual basis
(Frauenstein, 2019). Phishing, spear phishing, and other social engineering techniques are
being used against users on a regular basis (Almomani et al., 2013; Carlton & Levy,
2017). Phishing attacks target more than 37.3 million people per year (Real, 2013), and
costs organizations an average of $3.7 million annually (Wombat Security, 2015). This
figure includes loss of user productivity, cost of containing malware exploited by the
phishing attack, and cost to remediate loss of personal credentials. Phishing is also a
corporate and personal data theft issue as noted by Nelson (2016). According to Acquisti
et al. (2010), users are clicking on phishing links and need improved ways to alert users
to not fall for phishing in emails. Alerting users to notice signs of phishing in emails by
utilizing S2 triggers such as audio/visual/haptic alerting would directly add to the body of
research aimed at assisting users to be less susceptible to phishing attack.
Significance
This study contributes to the significant area of phishing prevention social
engineering mitigation by increasing user phishing awareness through alerts and
warnings (Abass, 2018; Hong, 2016; Mouton et al., 2016). Zadelhoff (2016) indicated
that users are the biggest threat to an organization. Human behavior, while parsing
emails, is also a factor in user determination of whether an email is a phishing email
containing a malicious link, or a safe email (Pattinson et al., 2012).
Myounghoon et al. (2015) determined auditory cues assist with dual task
performance. Checking email and performing other work or personal tasks is considered
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dual task performance and causes individuals to be distracted (Kahneman, 2011; Mansi &
Levy, 2013). This information, combined with the research by Kahneman (2011),
indicate S2 could be triggered with auditory, visual, and haptic cues to alert a user of risktaking behaviors. Some ways to trigger S2 include audio alerts, visual alerts, text and
screen movement, text presented in a secondary language, and text presented in reverse.
Assisting the user in noticing signs of phishing in emails could possibly be studied
through the delivery of audio/visual/haptic alerts, thus, triggering S2. Vance et al. (2014)
studied security risk taking behaviors and effectiveness of security warnings. Their
research determined polymorphic warnings decrease habituation. Providing additional
research towards audio/visual/haptic alerting for signs of phishing in emails could build
upon previous research to help combat the problem of users clicking on phishing links.
This could result in less data loss, significant costs associated with data recovery, and
costs of information security efforts.
Barriers and Issues
This research study had several potential barriers and issues that were addressed.
One challenge was developing a SME survey containing as many elements of the PAWS
prototype as possible. A separate companion document was added to the survey to play
audio samples and visual icons for the SMEs to choose from. One barrier was collecting
SME responses and feedback in a two-week time period. This time factor had potential to
disrupt the research study timeline SME participants were rewarded with gift cards to
help mitigate this risk. Participants for the PAWS mobile application were recruited
through LinkedIn contacts of the primary investigator, a potential barrier was participants
becoming unwilling to download an app to their mobile device. Contact information of
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the researcher was added to the recruitment email to be available for questions and
comments about the mobile app. Another potential barrier was participants not
understanding the mobile app email screens or functionality of the mobile alert and
warning application. Contact information of the researcher was utilized in the few cases
users had issues with the mobile app itself.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
It was assumed that SMEs understood the survey and answered appropriately. It
was also assumed that PAWS participants will be readily available and willing to
participate in the study. Another assumption of this study was that participants were able
to operate their mobile device, that they regularly utilize sound and vibration on their
mobile phone, and that the simulated emails represented in the PAWS mobile application
were understandable and relatable for the study participants.
Limitations
A limitation of this study included unexpected events that limited the availability
of participants. A limitation of this study was that PAWS was designed to best represent
examples of phishing email messages to the participants of the study. If the examples of
phishing emails are deemed incorrect, or irrelevant to the user, the study was not
effective. If the data input “is either incorrect, of low quality, or irrelevant, the resulted
output is going to be ineffective regardless of the quality of the processing, colloquially,
garbage-in/garbage-out” (Levy & Ellis, 2006, p. 185). Other potential limitation
considerations include email content not being relevant to the participant, audio sounds
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and visual icons not being relevant or understandable by the participant, and urgency
level of the audio not matching the urgency understanding of the participant.
Financial limitations included inability to program a hover over links in email originating
from the participants email. This feature was limited to a picture, or screen of an email
with limited functionality.
Delimitations
A potential delimitation of this proposed study was choosing vague simulated
phishing messages. As a validation of emails chosen, extensive literature review, and recreation of emails were performed. Another delamination included audio/visual/haptic
warnings potentially not representing the urgency needed to spark the user’s attention. As
a validation of audio/visual/haptic warnings used in the prototype, SMEs were asked to
pair warnings with their perceived urgency of the simulated emails.
Definition of Terms
The following represent terms and definitions.
Alert –An alarm or other signal of danger (p. 30). (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2018).
Cybersecurity – “A computing-based discipline involving technology, people,
information, and processes to enable assured operations in the context of adversaries. It
draws from the foundational fields of information security and information assurance;
and began with more narrowly focused field of computer security” (Joint Task Force on
Cybersecurity Education, 2017, p. 16).
Haptics – “The science of touch. Use of technology promoted by interacting with
physical objects” (Chang, 2002, p. 84)
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Phishing – “Phishing is a form of social engineering in which an attacker attempts to
fraudulently acquire sensitive information from a victim by impersonating a trustworthy
third party” (Jagatic, 2007, p. 1).
System 2 Thinking – “Understanding a more aware state of mind in human behavior and
response” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 13).
Tactile cues – “Perceptible by touch: textures, vibrations, and bumps” (Chang, 2002, p.
84).
Vulnerability – “Human, organizational, and technical weaknesses that can be exploited
by an adversary” (Canfield, 2018, p. 827).
Warning – “Something that makes one understand there is a possible danger or problem,
especially one in the future” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2018, p. 390).
Summary
Social engineering and phishing are still problems that needs to be properly
mitigated and further included in the body of research that aims at reducing phishing
susceptibility among users. This research contributes toward phishing susceptibility
improvements among users by developing a prototype that alerted users to the signs of
phishing in emails with audio/visual/haptic alerting. SMEs opinion was gathered towards
validation of the most important signs of phishing users should be warned about. This
step included collecting SME opinion via survey to rank simulated phishing examples.
SMEs feedback was also used to pair alerts and warnings with emails. SMEs feedback
was also used to determine which set of audio/visual/haptic alerting should be paired with
matching signs of phishing in emails for presentation in the PAWS mobile application
prototype.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
Social Engineering
According to Krumholtz et al. (2015), social engineering can be defined as
manipulating users into providing sensitive information to an untrustworthy source.
Social engineering is also defined as one way to gain sensitive information about an
email recipient by taking advantage of human behavior (Abass, 2018). The sensitive
information obtained can consist of passwords, date of birth, mother’s maiden name,
social security number, and other identifiers that could be used to open or gain access to a
variety of financial, network, and social accounts (Krumbolz et al., 2015). According to
Hong (2012), phishing attacks are also used to steal personal information, credit card
information, intellectual property, corporate information, and national security secrets.
People are easily hacked by luring them to click on harmful links that lead to fake
websites with malware, downloading software, and running malicious applications
(Krumbolz et al., 2015). Deceiving the user into giving personal information can lead to
compromise of accounts (Abass, 2018). Social engineering preys on the innate human
tendency to trust and/or help others (Mouton et al., 2016). Depending on the level of
access the user has, this can lead to business compromise, as well as personal account
compromise. This research will focus on the social engineering channel of phishing, and
the signs of phishing in emails.
Motivators for attackers include money and information. According to Hong
(2012), money can be stolen directly out of a bank account from access granted directly
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or indirectly by the victim. In some cases, account credentials can be stolen through a few
different social engineering channels. For example, an attacker could lure people to a
website created to appear as a legitimate site and ask for the victims to enter their
username and password (Hong, 2012). Through this method, the attackers can harvest
several username and password combinations in attempt access to bank accounts or other
private accounts. Sometimes the account information is sold online in underground
networks where the access information is sold to others (Hong, 2012).
Social engineering attacks include and combine physical, social, and technical
aspects to achieve the goal of deceiving the user (Krumbolz et al., 2015). According to
Phishing.org (2019), social media can be exploited in many ways, including Facebook
Messenger. In this attack, Facebook users receive messages from someone already
familiar with them. This spoofed or impersonated person sends a message to the
Facebook user redirecting them to a spoofed page asking for log in credentials (Phishing
Examples, 2019). Many channels and attack vectors can be used in combination to gain
access to user accounts, and user networks through social engineering. Social engineering
channels include instant messaging, telephone, social network applications, cloud
services for corporations, multiplayer games, and websites (Hong, 2012; Kromboltz et
al., 2015). Fraudulent or phishing websites are also a common way to trick a user into
entering personal data. Some clues to fraudulent websites include spoofed content (the
web site was crafted to appear as a legitimate website) incorrect address bar URL, status
bar errors and overall security indicators (Dhamija et al., 2006).
Email phishing is the most common social engineering method (Hong, 2012). An
attacker can send an email with several ways to “bait” the user into giving personal
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information to the attacker. Phishing with email can also be used to direct a user to a fake
website and then have the user enter personal information into the fake website. Phishing
usually involves three phases (Hong, 2012). During the first phase, the victim usually
receives an email with one, or many signs of phishing in the email. The next phase
usually includes the victim either taking action by entering information as prompted by
the attacker, or other action suggested in the message usually resulting in the victim
giving the attacker the desired information. The final phase is monetizing the stolen
information in the form of selling the account information or by actually logging in as the
user and stealing money from an account or stealing the desired intellectual property or
secrets (Hong, 2012).
Hong (2012) concluded that the phishing is a problem that most likely will never
be solved. Hong (2012) suggested to address the worst aspects of phishing and work on
improving ways to prevent, attack, and respond to phishing attacks. Abass (2108)
determined the most effective defense to social engineering is to educate and assist users
in noticing signs of social engineering. This proposed research study aims at preventing
or at least mitigating the threat of phishing attacks by alerting users to the signs of
phishing in emails.
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Table 1
Summary of Social Engineering Description Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Abass, 2018

Literature
review and
synthesis

18 papers

Social engineering
analysis

Contech &
Schmick,
2015

Literature
review and
synthesis

15 papers

Social engineering
analysis

Hong, 2012

Literature
review and
synthesis

State of social
Suggested to
engineering/analysis work towards
better ways to
prevent, detect,
and respond.

Krumbholtz et
al., 2015

Literature
review and
synthesis

Social engineering
taxonomy

Provided a
taxonomy of
social
engineering
attacks,
illustrated realworld incidents
of successful
attacks

Mouton et al.,
2016

Literature
review and
synthesis

Social engineering
template

Proposed 10
social
engineering
templates

Two
models

Main Finding
or
Contribution
Determined
people are the
weakest link,
but also the
best tool to
defend against
social
engineering.

Determined the
most effective
defense against
social
engineering is
an educated
user.
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Signs of Phishing in Emails
There are several signs of phishing in emails (Wash & Cooper, 2018). Most
frequently, phishing emails will include more than one sign of phishing. Signs of
phishing in emails researched through a literature synthesis include but are not limited to:
sense of urgency, requiring action, monetary gain, misspelling and grammar issues,
greeting errors, signature errors, incorrect URL, request to click on links, request for
information, spoofed sender or content, unsolicited or unexpected attachments, address
mismatch, threatening language, and highly personalized emails (Chandrasekaran et al.,
2006; “Phishing Examples,” 2018; “Phishing Examples- What’s the risk, and how to
identify and deal with them”, 2019; Sheng et al., 2010; “The anatomy of a phishing
email,” 2019; Wash & Cooper, 2018; Yates & Harris, 2015).
Urgency
Urgency is a main sign of phishing in emails. Hong (2012) indicated that urgency
is a method for criminals to misdirect attention. They also described an urgency email as
sending an email to an email recipient warning people of an attack and instilling a sense
of urgency that a patch must be installed immediately. Urgency can also be used to
attempt to invoke an impulse emergency response from the recipient (Chandrasekaran et
al., 2006). Unusual log-in activity is another example of a tech-based urgency email that
requires an action from the user for an account to not be closed. Another example of
urgency would be notifying users of several failed logins to their account, instilling
urgency by insisting the user verifies their account immediately to avoid account deletion
(Sheng et al., 2010). Urgency can be presented in several ways. One example as
illustrated in Figure 1 illustrates the need for an urgent request from the recipient, so their
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account is not closed (Wash & Cooper, 2018). For the purpose of this research, urgency
will be portrayed as both technical (including loss of corporate email account, loss of
personal account connectivity, and corporate account access) and personal (including
immediate need to verify shipping address to a personal resistance and personal bank
account issues).
Figure 1
Sign of Phishing in Email: Sense of Urgency

Requiring Action from the Recipient
Requiring action from the email recipient is a sign of phishing in emails that plays
upon urgency and the user’s accounts or activities (“Phishing Examples - What’s the risk,
how to identify them and deal with them”, 2019). Figure 2 illustrates the need for action
from the recipient. The email appears to be from a shipper sending something to the
email recipient. Other phishing emails that utilize action on the part of the recipient
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include asking the recipient to review personal details for a specified account. Other
examples are phishing emails that ask the recipient to upgrade their account or to reset
their password. Phishing emails requiring action can also include unsolicited emails about
accounts the user does not have. Most businesses have policies that specify personal
information will not be requested through email, which should be an indication the email
is a phishing attempt.
Figure 2
Sign of Phishing in Email: Requiring Action

Monetary Gain for The Recipient
Monetary gain is also a sign of phishing in emails. Hong (2012) described filling
out a survey in exchange for a cash award. Cash reward is promised as a result from
action from the participant. This sign of phishing is usually accompanied by a request for
the victim’s bank account number to have a deposit directly sent to the victim’s account.
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The famous Nigerian Prince scam, or the Nigerian 419 scams are an example of
monetary gain as a sign of phishing in emails. The scam offers free money in exchange
for helping the attacker send large amounts of money. This style of attack has migrated to
social media platforms as spoofed accounts appearing to be accounts of the victim’s
friends asking for money or donations, as illustrated in Figure 3. The Nigerian prince
scam is still alive and well today through the social engineering channel of email (“What
motivates people to click: Phishing examples and techniques used”, 2018).
Figure 3
Sign of Phishing in Email: Monetary Gain

Misspelling and Grammar Issues
Misspelling and grammar errors in emails can be another sign of phishing in
emails as shown in Figure 4. Incorrect use of words, fragmented sentences, improper
word choice and misspelled words are cues to this sign of phishing (Caputo et al., 2014).
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Grammar errors are common in phishing emails crafted for recipients that are not in the
senders’ primary language spoken or are usually due to rushing to send out the emails.
With spellcheck and other grammar assistants with word processors, this sign of phishing
should be easily spotted (“Phishing Emails”, 2018). Misspelling of a spoofed account can
also be common for example of phishing (Hong, 2012). Punctuation errors as well as odd
or incorrect spacing may also fall under this category. Homographs may also be present
in grammatical errors. Homographs are words with the same spelling but different
meaning. These are usually used to persuade the recipient to click on a link (“Phishing
Emails” 2018).
Figure 4
Sign of Phishing in Email: Misspelling and Grammar Issues
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Greeting Errors
Greeting errors such as impersonal greeting, formal greeting, or unexpected
greeting, are another sign of phishing in emails as shown in Figure 5. If the recipient is
normally addressed from the sender with “Hi”, the recipient does not expect to see “Hey”
from the sender. Sirull (2019) described other examples of this sign of phishing in emails
as addressing the recipient in a formal way with “Dear Sir or Madam”. Another example
is addressing the recipient as “Dear User” or “Valued Customer”, (Hacquebord, 2017).
Figure 5 illustrates an incorrect greeting error of “hey you” from a sender that would not
address the customer in that way.
Figure 5
Sign of Phishing in Email: Greeting Errors
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Signature Errors
Signature errors such as Incorrect/Unexpected Signature include missing
information that should be contained in the signature such as phone number, address, title
and additional contact information (Hegde, 2019; Sirull, 2019). Missing this type of
contact information, especially for emails requesting or promising financial implications
can be a red flag for suspicion when identifying signs of phishing in emails, as illustrated
in Figure 6. Additionally, a sender including their email address in the signature block
could also be a signature error.
Figure 6
Sign of Phishing in Email: Signature Errors

Incorrect URL
Incorrect URL encompass issues with the URL continued in the email. In some
cases the target link does not match the link text (Berls, 2016). Misspelled URL’s are also
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common and a sign of phishing in an email (Hale et al., 2015). Hovering over URL’s will
allow the recipient to examine the text of the URL. Some signs of phishing include link
masks, shortened URL’s, incorrect email address from the sender, and hyperlinks leading
to a different URL than what is expected, as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7
Sign of Phishing in Email: Incorrect URL

Requesting the Recipient to Click on Links
Request to click on links are a sign of phishing in emails that is sometimes
characterized by asking the user to “Please click on the following link”.
Misleading links can be masked as a legitimate site (Vishwanath et al., 2018). Yates and
Harris (2015) indicated links should be typed, not copied, to the browser when requested
from an email. An example of requesting the recipient to click on a link is shown in
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Figure 8. In this example, the recipient is asked to click on a link to accept new terms and
conditions (“Phishing Scam”, 2017).
Figure 8
Sign of Phishing in Email: Request to Click on Links

Request for Information from the Recipient
Requests for information from the recipient is also a sign of phishing in email
(Hale et al., 2015). Phishing attempts will ask the recipient for password information,
username used on websites, personal information, health information, and payment card
data. Sirull (2019) indicated the sender should already have the information being
requested from the recipient. An example of this sign of phishing is shown in Figure 9. In
this example the recipient is directed to click on a link and then enter personal
information (“What Is Phishing?”, 2018).
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Figure 9
Sign of Phishing in Email: Request for Information

Spoofed Content or Spoofed Sender
Spoofed content and Spoofed sender are a common sign of phishing in emails.
Emails such as the one shown in Figure 10, appear to be from coworkers, family, or even
businesses the recipient has accounts with such as Paypal, Bank of America, or other
accounts (Caputo et al., 2014). The emails may also appear to come from the recipient’s
manager or boss. Another spoofed sender would be the CEO or other executive from the
participant’s place of employment (Dakpa & Augustine, 2017).
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Figure 10
Sign of Phishing in Email: Spoofed Sender or Content

Unsolicited or Unexpected Attachments
Unsolicited or Unexpected Attachments can also be a sign of phishing in emails.
Opening an attachment can sometimes infect the recipient’s device with virus or spyware
(Wyro, 2019). This sign of phishing in emails asks the recipient to open attachments that
the recipient did not ask for, or expect (Sirull, 2019). Email containing this sign of
phishing can appear to look like Figure 11.
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Figure 11
Sign of Phishing in Email: Unsolicited Attachment

Threatening Language
Threatening language can be a sign of phishing in emails presented in several
forms. Some emails such as this can be a result of a previous phishing attempt resulting
in a ransomware attempt towards the recipient (Abrams, 2018). Some threatening
language emails contain a “do this now, or you will pay” tone to the message. A
threatening language sign of phishing email with ransomware language is illustrated in
Figure 12.
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Figure 12
Sign of Phishing in Email: Threatening Language

Email Address Mismatch
Molinaro and Bolton (2017) indicated address mismatch is a common sign of
phishing in emails where the from address does not match the reply address as illustrated
in Figure 13.
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Figure 13
Sign of Phishing in Email: Sender Address Mismatch

Highly Personalized Emails
Highly personalized emails can indicate the sender has studied the recipient
through social media or search techniques (“Phishing Emails – What’s the risk, how to
identify them and deal with them”, 2019), which can be difficult to determine if an
attacker has studied the victim extremely well. Some examples of this sign of phishing in
emails include specific information social engineers can obtain from social medial sites to
craft an email that will grab the recipient’s attention (Corsica Technologies, 2018). Figure
14 describes this type of sign of phishing as a salary increase from the recipient’s place of
employment.
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Figure 14
Sign of Phishing in Email: Highly Personalized

Many examples of recent phishing attempts exist online or in literature. As
previously discussed, several signs of phishing in emails can be combined into one email
to increase the chances of tricking the recipient. For purposes of this study, one “main”
sign of phishing in email will be used for each example to obtain SMEs ranking
preferences for the top signs of phishing in emails. As illustrated through Figures 2-15,
many signs of phishing exist today and are still tricking recipients into clicking links,
and/or divulging personal information, despite user training methods.
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Table 2
Summary of Signs of Phishing in Emails from Literature
Sign
Number

Signs of
Phishing in
Email
Characteristics
Urgency

Literature
Sources

Description
from
Literature

Chandrasekaran
et al., 2006;
Sheng et al.,
2010, Hong,
2012

Attempting to Wash & Cooper,
invoke an
2018
impulse
emergency
response
from the
recipient. A
needed
response
from the user
as soon as
possible.

2

Requiring
action from the
participant

Dakpa &
Augustine,
2017; Sirull,
2019

Plays upon
urgency, and
requests
action from
the recipient
in order to
correct a
situation.

“Phishing
Emails –
What’s
the risk,
how to
identify
them and
deal with
them”,
2019

3

Monetary gain
for the
participant

Hale et al.,
2015

A cash
reward is
promised as a
result from
action from
the recipient.

What
motivates
people to
click:
Phishing
examples
and
techniques
used”,
2018

1

Figure Example
Source
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Table 2
Summary of Signs of Phishing in Emails from Literature - (continued)
Sign
Number

Signs of
Phishing in
Email
Characteristics
Misspelling
and/or grammar
errors

Literature
Sources

Description
from
Literature

Figure Example
Source

Caputo et al.,
2014; Dakpa
& Augustine,
2017; Hale et
al., 2015;
Sirull, 2019;
Yates &
Harris, 2015

Incorrect use
of words,
fragmented
sentences,
improper
word choice,
and words
misspelled in
an email.
Usually due
to senders
rushing to
write the
email

“Phishing
Emails”,
2018

5

Greeting errors

Dakpa &
Augustine,
2017; Hale et
al., 2015;
Sheng et al.,
2010; Sirull,
2019

Not
addressing
the recipient
as expected.
Too personal,
or formal of a
greeting.
“Dear
account
holder”
instead of
name (Sirull,
2019)

Hacquebord,
2017

6

Signature errors

Hegde, 2019; Sender not
Sirull, 2019; signing an
email as
expected.
Missing or
too much
information

4

“Phishing
Emails”,
2018
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Table 2
Summary of Signs of Phishing in Emails from Literature - (continued)
Sign
Number

Signs of
Phishing in
Email
Characteristics
Incorrect URL

Literature
Sources

Description
from
Literature

Figure Example
Source

Hale et al.,
2015; Sheng
et al., 2010;
Sirull, 2019

URL does not
match the
description of
what the
recipient
expected.
(When
hovering over
the url it does
not match the
indicated
text)

Berls, 2016

8

Requresting the
participant to
click on links

Vishwanath
et al., 2018;
Yates &
Harris, 2015

Vishwanath,
Harrison, &
Ng, 2018

9

Request for
information

Hale et al.,
2015; Sirull,
2019

Plays upon
urgency,
asking the
recipient to
“click here.”
Asking the
recipient for
personal
information,
files or
unexpected
items. Asking
the recipient
to send or
input personal
data that the
sender should
already have.

7

“What is
phishing”,
2018
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Table 2
Summary of Signs of Phishing in Emails from Literature - (continued)
Sign
Number

Signs of
Phishing in
Email
Characteristics
Spoofed content
and/or spoofed
sender

Literature
Sources

Description
from
Literature

Figure Example
Source

Caputo et al.,
2014; Dakpa
&
Augustine,
2017; Sirull,
2019; Yates
& Harris,
2015

Content
appears to be
from a
familiar or
reputable
source.
Sender
appears to be
from a
familiar
source. Clone
fishing. (An
email
appearing to
be from your
bank, but the
logo is odd
looking)

Corsica
Technologies,
2017

11

Unsolicited
and/or
unexpected
attachments

Hale et al.,
2015; Sirull,
2019;
Vishwanath
et al., 2018

Attachments
the recipient
did not ask
for or expect
in the email.

Wyro, 2019

12

Threatening
language

Molinaro &
Bolton,
2018; Sirull,
2019

Addressing
the recipient
in an
aggressive
manner. “Do
this now or
your will
pay.”

Abrams,
2018

10
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Table 2
Summary of Signs of Phishing in Emails from Literature - (continued)
Sign
Number

13

14

Signs of
Phishing in
Email
Characteristics
Address
mismatch

Literature
Sources

Description
from
Literature

Figure Example
Source

Molinaro &
Bolton,
2018; Sirull,
2019

The email
address of the
sender does
not match the
expected
sender.

“Watch your
inbox for
fake postal
service
emails”, 2017

Highly
personalized
emails

“Phishing
Emails –
What’s the
risk, how to
identify
them and
deal with
them.”2019

Emails
containing too
many or too
good to be
true details for
the recipient.
“You have
received a
raise from
your place of
employment.”

Corsica
Technologies,
2017

User Phishing Training
User training towards noticing the signs of phishing in email is considered a first
line of defense against social engineering and phishing attacks (NIST, 2018). Some
methods of user training include web-based videos, flyers and handouts, embedded
training, and realistic phishing tests (Miranda, 2018). Miranda (2018) indicated training
users on phishing detection and incident response are important in setting up a successful
corporate phishing training system. Foundational research by Dhamija et al. (2006)
suggested alternative approaches are needed to assist users in noticing signs of phishing
attack.
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Several approaches to end-user phishing training have been used to better train
end-users to the dangers of social engineering and phishing. Foundational research in this
area include Kumaraguru et al. (2009) who tested an embedded anti-phishing training
system, PhishGuru with 515 participants. PhishGuru trained participants to recognize
signs of phishing in email by delivering training messages after the user clicked URL
links in the phishing email (Kumaraguru, 2009). The training was delivered several times
over a 35-day period. Their results concluded that users with anti-phishing training
appear to be less vulnerable to phishing attempts against them as compared to
participants that did not receive anti-phishing training. On the other hand, Caputo et al.
(2014) determined embedded training did not reduce click rates on phishing emails. They
also suggested repetitive phishing training might yield better results over short-term
training.
Several styles of phishing training have been researched. Wash and Cooper
(2018) studied a phishing training method utilizing immediate feedback training from
simulated peers or experts. Facts-and-advice training was similar to common phishing
training today from experts, or rule-based training. “Stores” was a training style crafted to
appear to tell a story about a phishing experience. Simulated phishing messages were
presented to the user, and training was delivered if the user clicked on a simulated
phishing link. Facts-and-advice style training led to lower click rates when appearing to
come from an expert, while stories-based training appeared to have a lower click rate
when appearing to come from a peer (Wash & Cooper, 2018). Jensen et al. (2017), also
utilized simulated phishing messages and introduced a combination of rule-based and

39
mindfulness training over a multi-day time period. Their study concluded that
mindfulness techniques show promise as a phishing training method.
Gamification strategies, such as Anti-Phishing Phil (Sheng et al., 2007) uses an
interactive approach to training users to notice signs of phishing websites. Their research
concluded that gamification interaction can be an effective way to train users to notice
phishing signs (Sheng et al., 2007). Hale et al. (2014) began developing an anti-phishing
game that encompasses email simulation, email inbox simulation, web browser
simulation, and social medial simulation. Several end-user training strategies exist in
literature. Contributions to the area of research include recognizing when a user cannot
distinguish between a legitimate website and a spoofed website or email, and that antiphishing training participants are less likely to click on real phishing messages than those
that do not.
Table 3
Summary of Phishing End-User Training Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample
813

Instrument or
Construct
Embedded phishing
training through
email

Main Finding
or Contribution
Creating and
implementing
embedded
training effective
in a corporate
setting is
difficult.

Caputo et al.,
2014

Empirical
study via
experiment

Dhamija et
al., 2006

Empirical
study via
experiment
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Website

Many users
cannot
distinguish
between a
legitimate
website and a
spoofed/phishing
website
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Table 3
Summary of Phishing End-User Training Literature –(continued)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Jensen et al.,
2017

Empirical
study via
experiment

355

Kumaraguru
et al., 2009

Empirical
study via
experiment

515

Miranda,
2018

Literature
review and
synthesis

Sheng et al.,
2007

Empirical
study via
experiment
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Instrument or
Construct
Rule based and
Mindfulness
Phishing training
interventions

Main Finding
or Contribution
Evidence
supporting a
mindfulnessbased phishing
training may
help reduce, but
not eliminate,
phishing risk.

PhishGuruembedded antitraining system

Participants that
saw the antiphishing training
are less likely to
click on real
phishing
messages than
those that did
not receive
training.

Phishing training
best practices

Risks associated
with phishing
threat can be
reasonably
mitigated by a
measurable
phishing training
program.

Anti-Phishing Phil
Interactive Game

Participants who
played AntiPhishing Phil
performed better
at identifying
phishing
websites than
those that did
not.
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Table 3
Summary of Phishing End-User Training Literature – (continued)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Wash &
Cooper, 2018

Empirical
study via
experiment

1,945

Instrument or
Construct
Phishing training
via email

Main Finding
or Contribution
Facts -andadvice training
leads to lower
likelihood of
clicking on a
phishing link
when appearing
to be from an
expert than from
a peer.

Phishing Email Filtering Tools and Warning Systems
There are several email filtering solutions available today as a way to warn users
of signs of phishing in emails. Most warnings are visual popup windows and/or buttons
to click to report phishing emails to administration. There are also several appliancebased products that filter email on the corporate email server, and “learn” signs of
phishing in email either warn the user, or block the phishing URL (Dublin, 2018).
Google attempts to warn users of suspicious emails in Gmail by utilizing visual
alert banner messages that appear at the top of suspicious emails (“Can Gmail Detect
Phishing Scams?” 2019). Microsoft Office 365 includes anti-phishing protection and
warns users with visual alert messages and reporting buttons (Palarchio, 2016).
Proofpoint is an integrated security application. Their anti-phishing solution utilized
PhishAlarm, a tool that filters email and visually alerts the user to a sign of phishing
email as a secondary image appears on the email screen (“PhishAlarm and PhishAlarm
Analyzer Features and Benefits”, 2019). Barracuda offers anti-fraud and anti-phishing
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protection. Their product will pop up a visual warning to users if the URL is incorrect
(“Anti-Fraud and Anti-Phishing Protection”, 2019).
Phishing Susceptibility and Demographics
Research has been performed in the area of demographics and the relationship to
users being susceptible to phishing attempts against them. The results of this research are
important as it helps researchers understand if there is a specific demographic that is
more susceptible to phishing than others, and most likely needs either additional or more
specific training to assist the user in noticing signs of phishing. According to Darwish et
al. (2012), understanding user demographics and backgrounds can help improve security
awareness efforts and reduce phishing susceptibility.
Age, gender, education, and personality are a few demographics to consider
towards predicting user’s susceptibility. Age appears to be a strong predictor in user
susceptibility towards phishing attacks. Kumaraguru et al. (2009) found that participants
in the 18-25 age group were most susceptible to phishing attacks during a study of their
PhishGuru training system. During earlier work in 2007, Kumaraguru et al. (2007) tested
an online gamification training system, Anti-Phishing Phil - discovering the age group of
18 and younger were more susceptible than older age groups. Sheng et al. (2010)
conducted an online case study and survey indicating the age group 18-25 are more
susceptible to phishing.
Gender has also been studied as a data point towards demographic analysis
towards phishing susceptibility. Several studies have concluded that women are more
susceptible than men (Jegatic et al., 2007; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Olivera, 2017; Sheng
et al., 2009). Other studies show conflicting information; Sheng et al. (2007) found no
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significant correlation between participants gender, age, education or race in relation to
phishing susceptibility. Education and training for users has been determined to be an
important data point towards the ability to notice signs of phishing in emails and was
covered in a previous section of this literature synthesis. More research in this specific
area could benefit the field of demographics as it relates to phishing attempts, and thus,
reduce the gap in literature.
Table 4
Phishing Susceptibility and Demographics Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding
or Contribution
Review
determined need
for a machine
learning model
to predict
phishing
susceptibility
based on
demographic
traits.

Darwish et
al., 2012

Literature
synthesis

Jagatic et al.,
2007

Empirical
study via
experiment

487

Online form sent to
determine if
participants would
provide personal
information

Female students
were more
susceptible to
phishing attacks
than male
participants.

Oliveira et
al., 2017

Empirical
study via
experiment

158

Email of phishing
emails over a 21day period

Need for
personal
demographic
personalization
for phishing
warnings,
training, and
educational tools
for older users.
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Table 4
Phishing Susceptibility and Demographics Literature – (continued)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Sheng et al.,
2007

Empirical
study via
experiment

5182

Sheng et al.,
2010

Case study and
survey

1001

Instrument or
Construct
Online phishing
study using AntiPhishing Phil and
interactive game

Main Finding
or Contribution
Found no
significant
correlation
between
participants
gender, age,
education, or
race and
susceptibility to
phishing.

Online survey

Women are
more susceptible
than men to
phishing, age
group 18-25 are
more susceptible
to phishing.

Audio/Visual/Haptic Alerts and Warnings
Audio beeps, visual alerts, icons, and vibrations (haptic warnings) are used in
several consumer areas today to alert and warn users of potential issues or emergency.
Seatbelt warning systems are arguably the most recognizable automobile warning system.
According to Lohr (1974), many individuals were reluctant to use seatbelts in
automobiles. Adding an audible sound to remind the driver and passengers to buckle up
was used as an alert or warning. A 2007 Department of Transportation study determined
enhances seat belt reminder systems utilizing sound, icon, and text increased front
occupant seat belt use.
Additionally, rear-end collision systems are also in place, and being researched
(Scott & Gray, 2008). Such systems combine audio/visual/haptic methods to alert the
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driver to potential issues. Scott and Gray (2008) determined there is promise in the area
of using tactile methods to draw attention to hazards for the driver. Blind spot warnings
such as a blinking light shown in the rearview mirror can also alert the driver of a car in
their blind spot (“Should Your New Car Have Blind Spot Monitoring”, 2019).
Several visual icons exist today for warning drivers of issues with the car or
driving conditions (Greene, 2016). Dashboard icons alert the driver of engine issues, car
running on auxiliary power or battery, slippery conditions or traction system, high
temperature, gas tank low, and fasten seatbelt. There is also significant research dedicated
to audio sounds and alerts played inside of vehicles (Krisher, 2016). According to Krisher
(2016), the average car has 10-15 different sounds played for various alerts and warnings.
Alerts and warnings are tested on drivers in research studies to determine if the sound is
effective as a warning, or if the sound is distracting (Kirsher, 2016).
Jensen et al. (2011) concluded through a simulated driving experiment on 25
participants that steering wheel vibrations (or haptic feedback) provided an overall
improvement in driver safety using steering wheel haptic feedback to avoid hitting
obstacles. Vibrations can happen at increased intensity to alert the driver of increasingly
urgent situations (Jensen et al., 2011). Vibrating seats are another use of haptic warnings
for drivers. Steering wheel and seat vibrations are used by several automotive
manufacturers today to warn drivers of potential danger such as lane departures and road
hazards (Kane, 2012). Research by van der Heiden et al. (2016) discovered that
audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings should be given in a timely manner. Their study
of 40 driver simulated participants indicated alerts and warnings are helpful for lane-
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change departures but must be given at least 500m before potential collision (van der
Hidden et al., 2016).
Collision warning systems for vehicles using audio/visual/haptic factors are also
incorporated into modern vehicles (Kane, 2012). Systems can be configured to minimize
nuisance factors of the alarms (Ernst & Wilson, 2002). According to Ernst and Wilson
(2002), Collision warning systems reduce collisions by warning and alerting the driver of
potential hazards (ACAS Program Final Report, 1998).
Other areas consumers benefit from audio/visual/haptic alerting are medical alarm
systems for patients. Audio beeps, visual flashing icons, and alarm sounds alert to get the
attention of medical personnel if a patient is having difficulty or in danger (“Continuous
Wireless Pressure Monitoring and Mapping with Ultra-Small Passive Sensors for Health
Monitoring and Critical Care”, 2019). Urgency is represented by color of visual
information and specific urgent frequencies. Weather warnings also convey urgency by
specific colors used and specific alarm warnings (Event Alert System, 2019).
Alerts and warnings containing audio/visual/haptic feedback for a user could
reduce habituation to alerts and warnings but should be meaningfully interpreted by the
user. This theory is derived from Kahneman (2011)’s theory of Thinking Fast and Slow
related to the S2 thinking. Findling and Mayrhofer (2015) researched approaches to using
haptic vibration as a feedback channel for consumers as it pertains to detecting if an
electronic device is real or replaced by attackers. Participants were able to determine if
the device was real by interpreting a vibration upon authenticating to the device. Hoggan
et al. (2009) studied the meanings that can be conveyed through audio and haptic tactile
feedback. For example: an audio and haptic combination should adequately convey
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urgency between a low phone battery warning, and a low heart rate warning (Hoggan et
al., 2009). Hoggan et al. (2009) concluded that a thoughtful combination audio and tactile
methods can be intuitively interpreted by the user. This finding stresses the importance of
accurate representation of audio and tactile warnings that are suited properly for the
urgency of the event.
Table 5
Alerts and Warnings in Literature
Study
Findling &
Mayrhofer,
2015

Methodology
Empirical study
via experiment

Freedman et
al., 2007

Observational
field data
collection

Greene, 2016

Observational
field data
collection

Hoggan et al.,
2009

Empirical
study via
experiment

Sample
12

40,000
passenger
vehicles

18

Instrument or
Construct
Android app

Main Finding or
Contribution
Vibration is a
promising way to
authenticate devices
to users.

Enhanced seat belt
reminder system

Determined
features were
found to have
significant effect
on driver seat
belt use.

Automotive
dashboards

Collection of
common
automobile
dashboard visual
icons.

Stimulus ranking
for audio and
haptics

Combining
audio and tactile
methods
information can
be derived and
urgency
interpreted
intuitively.
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Table 5
Alerts and Warnings in Literature – (continued)
Jensen et al.,
2011

Empirical
study via
experiment

25
Steering wheel
simulator
haptic feedback
participants

Krisher, 2016

Observational
field data
collection

Lohr, 1974

Seatbelt
warning
system

Scott & Gray,
2008

Empirical
study via
experiment

16
Driving warning
simulator
system
participants

Tactile warnings
show promise in
reduced reaction
time in rear-end
collisions.

Van der
Hidden et al.,
2016

Field study via
experiment

24
Visual in-car
participants warning system

Early visual incar warning
systems are
effective.

Automotive sounds
and alerts

Overall
improvement in
driver safety
using steering
wheel haptic
feedback to
avoid hitting
obstacles.
The average car
has 10-15
different sounds
played for
different
reminders and
alerts.
Patent on
seatbelt warning
system.

User Use of Smartphones
Poushter and Stewart (2016) indicated that the volume of smartphone ownership
and use has increased in Europe, the United States, and emerging economies around the
world. Their research concluded that at least 89% of Americans own a smartphone
(Poushter & Stewart, 2016). Van Rijn (2019) studied smartphone use as it pertains to
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reading email and determined an average of 67% of consumers use a smartphone to
check their email.
Most email is checked with a mobile device and then with a laptop/desktop
(Nelson, 2017; van Rijn, 2019). Nelson (2017) stated that emails opened and viewed on a
mobile device have doubled over the last five years. McLeod (2018) indicated that
consumers now spend more than five hours a day on their smartphones.
Summary of What is Known and Unknown in Literature
It is known that most users are using smartphones and laptops to view and
respond to emails daily (McLeod, 2018; van Rijn, 2019), and email phishing is the most
common social engineering method (Hong, 2012). It is known that several signs of
phishing in emails still exist today and continue to trick users into clicking links and
divulge personal information to social engineers. Sense of urgency, requiring action from
the recipient, promise of monetary gain, misspelling and grammar errors, greeting errors,
signature errors, incorrect URL, requesting the recipient to click on links in the email,
request for information from the recipient, spoofed content or sender, unsolicited or
unexpected attachments in the email, threatening language, address mismatch, and highly
personalized emails scams are continuing to lure users today.
It is known phishing training does work to lower the percentage of click rates on
signs of phishing among users, however, phishing attacks remain a problem today
(Abass, 2018). Visual alerting systems such as: Phishing training, phishing reporting
buttons, alerting dashboards, phishing alert tools, and phishing warning systems, are
showing promise of assisting users in noticing signs of phishing in emails sooner, and
thus reducing the risk of business or personal financial loss through phishing attacks. A
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considerable gap in phishing alerting is noticeable regarding audio and haptic feedback as
an alerting and warning mechanism for identifying signs of phishing in emails.
There is extreme importance placed on the ability for users to detect and respond
to phishing attacks (Jensen et al., 2017). Anti-phishing training, yet effective, is not
enough fully reduce phishing susceptibility. This research aims at improving ways to
improve recognition time to signs of phishing in emails by alerting users to the signs of
phishing in emails using audio/visual/haptic alerting on a smartphone and/or laptop. This
study will also add to the body of knowledge surrounding demographics and phishing
susceptibility, participant attention span, and the potential effect of phishing
susceptibility.
It is known that alerts and warnings assist people in noticing danger in several
areas of daily life sooner than if alerts and warnings were not present. Automobiles and
vehicle warning examples such as blind spot indicators, lane departure warnings, seatbelt
not fasted warnings are consistently being researched and improved. Applying alerts and
warnings from automobiles to emails containing signs of phishing in emails could add to
the body of research attempting to alert users to email danger sooner. It is unknown how
users would respond to a combination of audio, visual, and haptic alerting for signs of
phishing in email delivered on smartphones and laptops. It is also unknown if habituation
would be an issue with over-alerting users to the signs of phishing in emails. This
research study would examine and test this research area. Thus, it appears a gap in the
literature would be reduced by performing a phishing alerting and warning study utilizing
audio/visual/haptic alerts on the signs of phishing in emails with participants. By
conducting preliminary questions regarding demographics and attention span, additional
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research to the body demographic indicators in phishing could be used. The PAWS
mobile application could then be used to effectively test user reaction time to signs of
phishing in emails after presented with audio/visual/haptic delivered alerts on mobile
devices.

52

Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview of Research Design
This research study was conducted in three phases as shown in Figure 15. The
development and testing of the PAWS mobile app prototype assisted users in noticing
signs of phishing in emails through alerting and warning by audio/visual/haptic alerts.
Also defined as a “thing”, the PAWS prototype addressed a problem, which is the
foundation of developmental research (Ellis & Levy, 2009). Defined as sequential
exploratory research by Creswell and Creswell (2017), this developmental research study
empirically assessed participants’ results through both qualitative and quantitative data
analysis that built into sequential phases of a qualitative step followed by a quantitative
data analysis step. The methodological research design for this study included sequential
exploratory research design (Creswell, 2017). According to Ivankova et al. (2006),
sequential exploratory research design is a valid methodology for developmental
research, especially when conducting applied research.
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Figure 15
Proposed Overview of the Research Design Process

The first phase of this research study utilized initial qualitative data collection
phrase using Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) (Straub, 1989). The expert panel validated
the initial signs of phishing in emails in ranked order, matched audio and visual warnings
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for each sign of phishing in email that (in the SMEs opinion) reflected the severity of the
sign of phishing, and weighed in on an appropriate measures for ability to notice and time
to notice phishing in emails by the users. The second phase of this research study
encompassed the development and testing of PAWS. The third and final phase tested the
effectiveness of audio, visual, and haptic alerting to the top signs of phishing in emails.
This phases also included a qualitative and quantitative data collection with the PAWS
mobile app participants (Straub, 1989).
This research study resulted in developing a mobile application, PAWS, that was
used to conduct the research and testing of the effectiveness of audio/visual/haptic alerts
and warnings to assist in reducing phishing susceptibility. As previously stated, users
need improved ways to notice signs of phishing in emails, thus, preventing significant
data and financial losses. Users are continuously clicking on phishing links and need
better ways to alert them to not fall for phishing emails (Abass, 2018). PAWS mobile
application development and testing adds to the body of research in this area.
Phase I
Utilizing the literature synthesis results in Chapter 2, a library of signs of phishing
in email was developed into a list for the SMEs to rank the level of importance. Rank
order and frequency analysis were used to determine what signs of phishing should be
included in the PAWS mobile app. If all signs of phishing email screens include all alerts
and warnings, or alert fatigue could result (Kesselheim, et al., 2011). Alert fatigue caused
by excessive warnings could possibly be mitigated by highlighting the most important
alerts and warnings (Kesselheim, et al., 2011). With user fatigue in mind, the top five
signs of phishing were included in the programming of the PAWS mobile app.
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The SMEs ranked what they felt the top signs of phishing in emails were. As
indicated by Cooper (2014), narrowing down the top five (from 14 signs of phishing in
email) are important as people summarize data in round ranking numbers as shown in
Table 6. Isacc and Schindler (2014) described several top lists and indicated the
importance of narrowing down “top” in categories. This listing and narrowing down of
the top signs were utilized to reduce fatigue among PAWS mobile app participants. The
initial survey instrument will be conducted using Survey Monkey, using Delphi
methodology for expert feedback on this subject (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014), each SME
received an email invitation to participate in the initial survey. Additional survey
questions as well as the SME survey companion file examples are shown in Appendix A.
Table 6
SME Survey – List of Initial Signs of Phishing
Sign of Phishing
Sense of urgency

Short Examples of Sign of Phishing
Unusual log in activity/failed log in attempts – click here
to log in
Your account might be deleted
Mailbox is almost full

Requiring action

Click here to review details
Verify shipping address
Routine action – password reset
Update your account

Monetary gain

End user will receive a sum of money into their account if
they help the sender
Fill out a survey for $25.00
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Table 6
SME Survey – List of Initial Signs of Phishing – (cont.)
Sign of Phishing
Misspelling and grammar issues

Short Examples of Sign of Phishing
Incorrect tense
Misspelled body of text
Misspelled sender
Misspelled recipient

Greeting errors

Impersonal greeting – using “Hey” when the
recipient expects “Hi”.
Unexpected greeting – when expecting to be
addressed differently
Formal greeting – Dear Sir or Madam

Signature errors

Unexpected sign off – expecting Thank you, Mark
Missing signature content – does not contain
phone number, address

Incorrect URL

Target does not match the link text
Misspelled url
Shortened url

Request to click on links

Please click the following link

Request for information

Need your password, username

Spoofed sender or content

Email appearing to be from your boss
Email appearing to be from your Friends list
Email appearing to be from your LinkedIn
connections
Email appearing to be from Neflix, BoA or other
accounts
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Table 6
SME Survey – List of Initial Signs of Phishing – (cont.)
Sign of Phishing
Unsolicited or unexpected
attachments

Short Examples of Sign of Phishing
Email with a file the end user did not ask for

Address mismatch

From address does not match the reply address

Threatening Language

You will have to pay X if you do not respond

Highly Personalized Emails

Spear phishing examples

The survey also included a library of icons and sounds for the SMEs to pair with
the signs of phishing in emails that they find to be most important. The survey included
visual icons and audio to assign to the top signs of phishing. An example of visual icon
matching examples are shown in Figure 16. An example of audio matching is shown in
Figure 17. This feedback assisted in pairing a sign of phishing in email to an icon and
sound of matching severity. An example of the haptic pairing survey question is shown in
Figure 18.
Figure 16
Example of SME Survey – Choose Visual Icon Alert
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Figure 17
Example of SME Survey – Choose Audio Sound Warning

Figure 18
Example of SME Survey – Choose Haptic Vibration Warning

Also during this survey, the SMEs were asked their opinion on how long (in
seconds) it should take a user to notice a sign of phishing in email. The SMEs were
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surveyed to include their opinion on characteristics of a user’s ability to notice a sign of
phishing in email. This assisted in finding a benchmark time to notice and ability to
notice based on expert opinion.
Phase II
Phase II included the development of the PAWS mobile app prototype. SMEs
feedback on the top signs of phishing in emails were paired with the SME feedback on
audio, visual, and haptic signs that were used to alert the user of phishing. The SMEs
characteristics of ability to notice and time to notice phishing in emails were included in
the prototype design. A screen for participants to indicate what sign of phishing they saw
was used after email screens when the participant clicked “Phishing” was added to the
developmental design of PAWS. The data collected from this screen was analyzed to
determine ability to notice signs of phishing in emails by the participants.
Pilot testing of the prototype was conducted in this phase. Testing functionality of
applications is an important part of application design (Rubin & Chisnell, 2008). The
pilot testing included five participants and data was verified to ensure proper capture of
all data points were considered and recorded. Observations, scoring, and manual
measurements of time were conducted to ensure the assessment by the PAWS mobile app
prototype is accurate.
Phase III
Phase III encompassed the main research study with 205 participants. The
participants answered a short demographic survey as shown in Appendix B. The
participants then completed an attention span test as shown in Appendix C. The
participants then entered the PAWS mobile app. Each participant saw several simulated
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emails verified from Phase 1 as the top signs of phishing in emails. Alerts and warnings
accompanied the simulated emails as decided by the SMEs in Phase 1. The research
design process is illustrated in Figure 15.
Instruments and Prototype Development
Instrument for SMEs Identification of Top Signs of Phishing in Emails
To identify SMEs feedback on the top signs of phishing in emails, a Survey
Monkey survey was used. SurveyMonkey.com is a valid online survey and statistical
analysis tool (Evans et al., 2009). Emails developed from literature were placed in a
random order for the SMEs to rank. Survey Monkey’s data tools were used as data
collection and correlation to determine frequency and final ranking.
Instrument for SMEs Ranked Critical Threats, Paired with Unique A/V/H Alerts and
Warnings
Included in the same survey for SMEs Identification of Top Signs of Phishing in
Emails, survey questions pertaining to SMEs opinion on preferred and ranked pair of
audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings. Visual icons, audio sounds, and haptic vibration
timing were presented for the SMEs to rank and pair.
Instrument for SMEs Feedback on Ability to Notice, Time to Notice, and Ability to Notice
Signs of Phishing in Emails
Included in the same survey for SMEs Identification of Top Signs of Phishing in
Emails, survey questions pertaining to SMEs feedback on ability to notice, time to notice,
and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails were included as shown in Figures 19 and
20.

61
Figure 19
Example of SMEs Survey – Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails

Figure 20
Example of SMEs Survey – Time to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails
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Instrument for SMEs Feedback on Validated Maximum Time to Notice Signs of Phishing
in Emails
Included in the same survey for SMEs Identification of Top Signs of Phishing in
Emails, a survey question pertaining to SMEs feedback on the maximum time to notice
signs of phishing in emails was determined as shown in Figure 21.
Figure 21
Example of SMEs Survey – Max Time to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails

Instrument for Participant Demographic Information
Demographic questions for each participant were asked in the PAWS mobile
application. Participants were assigned a unique number to ensure confidentiality of the
participants. Qualifying questions were asked first in the demographic questions section.
Each participant must be over the age of 18, have more than one email account, use a
mobile device, and check email on their mobile device. Each participant ID was used to
uniquely identify participants and PAWS data collection, however, no direct relationship
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between the individual who participated, and the data was tracked to follow anonymity
requirements and be consistent with IRB requirements. An example of the demographic
questions are shown in Appendix B. Additionally, the PAWS post survey questions
appeared after the PAWS test. The questions asked if the user noticed if their phone
vibrated during the test, as well as if they heard any audible alerts. The questions were
aimed at determining if participants normally utilize their mobile device audio and haptic
response features and also determined if the participant is utilizing mobile device
accessibility features if needed.
Instrument for Participant Attention Span Information
Attention span testing for participants was conducted as a similar test to
Psychology Today’s Attention Span Test:
(https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/tests/personality/attention-span-test) and was
contained in the PAWS Mobile App. After each attention span test, answers were
summed for an attention span score for each participant. Participants were asked a six
attention span questions. Answers were ranked on a five-point scale with values of: five
for ‘quite often’, four for ‘often’, three for ‘sometimes’, two for ‘rarely’, and one point
for ‘almost never’. Participants were assigned a unique number to ensure confidentiality
of the participants. Each number was used to uniquely identify participants and PAWS
Mobile App data collection, however, no direct relationship between the individual who
participated, and the data will be tracked to follow anonymity requirement and be
consistent with IRB requirements. An example of the PAWS attention span test is shown
in Appendix C.
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PAWS Prototype Development
After gathering SMEs responses in Phase 1, The PAWS Mobile App was
developed as a mobile app for both Google Play Store and Apple App Store for the
application to be downloaded on participant’s mobile devices. Developmental design was
utilized encompassing minimum requirements of the application as follows:
1. Application was a hard-coded screen delivery/slideshow format of simulated
phishing emails. Participant email accounts were not used.
a. Simulated emails by SMEs ranking of the top signs of phishing in emails
with pairings of audio/visual/haptic warnings
2. Application was able to record user clicks and time in seconds for clicking
legitimate or phishing for each email.
a. To measure ability to notice signs of phishing in emails
b. To measure time to notice phishing in emails per participant
3. Application displayed a “what sign did you notice” screen for participants to click
the sign of phishing they saw in the email
a. To measure ability to notice signs of phishing in emails
4. Application was able to vibrate or shake the device for specific simulated
phishing emails
a. Based on SMEs feedback, haptic vibrations were applied
5. Development of simulated phishing slides included:
a. Simulated phishing email slides without signs of phishing
b. Simulated phishing emails examples from published sources
6. Application records and formats all data for analysis tools
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The PAWS mobile app prototype was delivered to the participants in two process
flows, totaling four experiment groups. Process 1, as shown on Figure 22, included the top
five signs of phishing presented as simulated phishing emails to the study participants
without audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings. This group (Group 1) did not contain
audio, visual, or haptic alerting. Each simulated email was presented with a Legitimate and
Phishing button at the bottom of the screen.
The elapsed time for each participant to click Legitimate or Phishing while viewing
each simulated email screen was recorded. The elapsed time it took the participant to click
was compared to the SMEs baseline time of 25 seconds and determined if the click time is
considered acceptable. After clicking Legitimate or Phishing, a screen appeared asking the
participant what signs of phishing they noticed on the previous screen. The screen also
included an “I don’t know, it just looked like phishing”. All choices the users clicked were
recorded and correlated in analysis tools.
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Figure 22
Proposed Overview of PAWS Process 1
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Process two, as shown on Figure 23 included randomized audio/visual/haptic
warnings as determined from SMEs’ ranking of the top signs of phishing in emails, and
audio/visual/haptic pairings from Phase I of this study. This process included Group 2,
audio warnings and visual alerts (AV). Group 3, haptic alerts (H), and Group 4, audio,
visual, and haptic alerts and warnings (AVH). Each simulated email was presented with a
Legitimate and Phishing button at the bottom of the screen.
The elapsed time for each participant to click Legitimate or Phishing while viewing
each simulated email screen was recorded. The elapsed time it took the participant to
click was compared to the SMEs baseline time of 25 seconds and determined if the click
time is considered acceptable. After clicking Legitimate or Phishing, a screen appeared
asking the participant what signs of phishing they noticed on the previous screen. The
screen also included an “I don’t know, it just looked like phishing”. All choices the users
clicked were recorded and correlated in analysis tools.
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Figure 23
Proposed Overview of PAWS Process 2
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Randomization of simulated email screens, as well as user fatigue of email viewing
was addressed in several ways for phase II. For each sign of phishing, four simulated
emails examples were designed, utilizing literature review to validate signs of phishing
contained in the email example. All designs were of varying length and randomized per
experiment group as shown in Table 7.
Table 7
PAWS Simulated Email Screens - Length Randomization Table
SME
Rank
1
2
3
4

5

Sign
Description
Sense of
Urgency
Requiring
Action
Request for
Information
Misspelling
and
Grammar
Issues
Request to
Click on
Links

Group 1
No AVH
UrgencyShort

Group 2
A/V
Urgency1

Group 3
H
UrgencyMed

Group 4
A/V/H
UrgencyLong

ActionLong

ActionShort

Action1

ActionMed

InfoMed

InfoLong

InfoShort

Info1

Spelling1

SpellingMed

SpellingLong SpellingShort

LinksShort

Links1

LinksMed

LinksLong

Randomization of experiment groups (AV, H, & AVH) was addressed by randomizing
alert and warning examples as shown in Table 7. Each participant saw a total of 20
simulated emails during PAWS mobile app testing. Each experiment group contained an
example of one of the top five signs of phishing. Group one, NAVH (no audio, visual, or
haptic) was presented to all participants first for the first five simulated email screens
shown to the participant. The randomization of both email length, alert, and warning
groups are shown in Table 8.
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Table 8
PAWS Experiment Groups - Randomization Table
Screen
Order
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Simulated
Email Version
UrgencyShort
ActionLong
InfoMed
Spelling1
LinksShort
UrgencyLong
Action1
InfoLong
SpellingShort
LinksMed
Urgency1
ActionMed
InfoShort
SpellingMed
LinksLong
UrgencyMed
ActionShort
Info1
SpellingLong
Links1

Group
No AVH
No AVH
No AVH
No AVH
No AVH
AVH
H
AV
AVH
H
AV
AVH
H
AV
AVH
H
AV
AVH
H
AV

Effectiveness of the Prototype
The initial survey measured SMEs’ response pertaining to the validity and
provided ranking for the signs of phishing in emails, A/V/H pairings, and the tasks used
for the measurements of (a) ability to notice, (b) time to notice, and (c) ability to notice
signs of phishing in emails. Pilot testing of the PAWS mobile application was completed
prior to PAWS participant study with five testers to ensure all measures were valid, and
any data or performance issues were resolved. Multiple specifically testing was
completed to ensure the PAWS mobile application properly recorded the score associated
with the user’s ability to notice and was compared with the pre-determined scores for the
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sampled emails available in the application. Moreover, multiple testing was completed to
ensure the PAWS mobile app recorded the time (in seconds) associated with the user’s
time to notice and was compared to the time (in seconds) accurately. Several audio alerts
were collected from warning systems, formatted to play as an audio clip with visuals, and
then presented to the SMEs in a companion survey form for ranking preferences.
Validity and Reliability
To design a measure that has both high validity and reliability, this study utilized
sequential exploratory developmental research combining both qualitative and
quantitative methodologies along with the development of the PAWS mobile app. This
research included three phases for development, testing, and data collection of the PAWS
mobile application. The first data collection point was Phase I. SMEs were asked to (1)
rank signs of phishing in order of importance, (2) Pair/match audio warnings with what
they felt was the appropriate for each sign of phishing, (3) Pair/match visual warnings
with what they felt was the appropriate visual icon for each sign of phishing, (4)
Pair/match haptic warnings with what they felt was the appropriate haptic warning
timing. (5) Provide their perspective on the tasks for the measure of ability to notice
phishing in emails (6) Provide their perspective on the measure of time to notice phishing
in emails, and (7) Provide their perspective on measurement of ability to notice signs of
phishing in emails. The Delphi methodology of development and validation of Phase I
initial list and library by SMEs was used as the input to Phase II (Tracy & Richey, 2007).
Delphi methodology is a well-established qualitative and quantitative research elicitation
process to enable a group of experts to reach consensus on specific set of requirements or
prioritization process (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). Data collection for Phase II included
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pilot user testing and qualitative feedback for improvements towards the PAWS mobile
app prototype. This step also included the exploratory research design steps of building
the PAWS mobile app prototype. Pre-analysis data screening was conducted in Phase II
(See section “Pre-Analysis Data Screening” below). Phase III encompassed all of the
participant data, qualitative and quantitative data collection, validity verification, and
statistical analysis.
Reliability
During the first data collection in Phase I, $10.00 Amazon gift cards were
awarded to the SMEs to ensure their participation. This was in effort to increase
reliability in SME responses and commitment to the research study. To produce stable
and accurate PAWS results, consistent object measurement was completed by hard
coding the PAWS mobile application. Each participant saw exactly the same simulated
email screens, in the same order. To ensure participant scores represent accurate
variables, internal consistency was used to correlate reliable performance over all
participant data (Salkind, 2003).
Validity
Validity was an important measure in this research process to ensure instrument
measures (Straub, 1989). As indicated by Salkind (2003) content validity was addressed
through the literature review of this research. The literature synthesis represents the body
of knowledge surrounding available examples of signs of phishing in emails. This
information formed the SME survey for the SME ranking of the top signs of phishing in
emails. Criterion validity was addressed by utilizing SME feedback for (a) ability to
notice, (b) time to notice and (c) ability to notice signs of phishing in emails. This
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information was the basis of measurement for participant criterion (Salkind, 2003).
Construct validity (Salkind, 2003) was ensured by utilizing the literature synthesis of this
research to establish a foundation for (a) prior studies with simulated and real phishing
emails, (b) prior surveys regarding demographics, and (c) effects of end user phishing
training, and (d) prior studies and tests founded upon attention span.
Bias can also be an issue with application development. Bias was controlled by
ensuring only SME validated content appeared for the simulated phishing slides in the
PAWS mobile application. Bias questions were addressed for the demographic surveys
by using templated Survey Monkey demographic surveys as opposed to self-created
questions and surveys (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Reliability and validity were critical to
this research study. Mitigation steps were taken to reduce threats to the research data
validity and reliability (Ellis & Levy, 2006).
Population and Sample
To achieve the required approximately 25 SMEs, for the SMEs survey, personal
networks were contacted to solicit about 40 cybersecurity experts, with the anticipation
that at least 25 of them would agree to participate. Screening for SMEs participation was
verified by preliminary survey questions: Cybersecurity degree obtained, years in
cybersecurity, professional cybersecurity/IT certifications, and current job position as
shown in Appendix A. Participants were requested to participate in the study from the
researcher’s LinkedIn contacts and through researcher’s email contacts. Amazon gift
cards for $10.00 were awarded to the SMEs upon participation in the initial survey. A
total of 32 SMEs participated in the survey.
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For the PAWS mobile application study, a sample of the population was used to
gather a representation of the general population (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). At least 150
participants were recruited for the PAWS mobile application study, targeting a minimum
100 participants in order to show statistical power and significance (Cohen,1988).
Sample of convenience method was used from personal networks to recruit the
participants. This method was limited as more participants could have involved if socially
linked to the researcher. Recruiting was done in English. Screening for study participants
was verified by preliminary questions in the demographic survey as shown in Appendix
B. Participants needed to be 18 years of age or older, have at least one email account, use
a mobile device, and check their email on a mobile device.
Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Pre-analysis data screening was utilized on collected data before the full
analyzation of collected data occurs. This step prevented the majority of data collection
errors (Levy & Ellis, 2006). To verify inaccurate data entry, visual verification was
performed before manual data entry of data collected. This study also used pre-analysis
data screening methods (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013). Mertler and Vannatta (2013)
indicated pre-analysis data screening is needed to ensure accuracy of data collected.
Validation of this data included examining the variables to ensure no values are outside
of the expected range. Test data was also be checked to ensure coded values had
corresponding categories. Missing data, extreme values, and assumptions were analyzed
to ensure data did not interfere with study results (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013).
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Data Analysis
Data analysis for Phase I was conducted through Survey Monkey analysis tools.
Semantic differential scale was used for the SMEs to rank the top signs of phishing.
During the same survey, the SMEs frequency majority opinion of ability to notice and
time to notice phishing in emails was be recorded. The highest rate of choice for each
SMEs survey question will be used towards the PAWS mobile application. Each SME
opinion on amount of time it should take a user to notice a sign of phishing in emails, and
the length of time it should take to measure ability to notice signs of phishing in emails
were anonymously recorded. Responses were recorded and analyzed determining
frequency analysis for the top signs of phishing in emails, A/V pairings, ability to notice,
time to notice, and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails – addressing research
questions RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4. Phase II data was recorded and analyzed through
PAWS mobile app development and testing and answered RQ5. The final phase of this
research study included data analysis from the participant actions during PAWS testing
and answered RQ6a, RQ6b, RQ6c, RQ7a, RQ7b, and RQ7c. Data analysis was
performed on the results of this study for each participant and compared to participant
groups. The participant groups were coded into groups for specific analysis.
Participants were asked to click the corresponding buttons when they noticed a
sign of phishing in any of the 20 simulated emails presented to them from the PAWS
mobile app. Measurements included participants’ ability to notice signs of phishing in
emails, time to notice phishing in emails, age, gender, experience with phishing training,
attention span, and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails.
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Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test for significant differences
between groups. One-Way ANOVA testing was used to answer RQ6a, RQ6b, and RQ6c
as well as on the data collected following Mertler and Vannatta (2013) guidance for
addressing RQ7a, RQ7b, and RQ7c.
Resources
This study was reviewed by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) as human
participants are involved in the study. A Survey Monkey license was utilized for the
initial survey. Information security and cybersecurity SMEs were needed for the initial
survey. LinkedIn and was used to contact SMEs and PAWS mobile app participants. An
application developer was needed for the development of the PAWS prototype and
application. A graphic designer was needed for the creation of email screens and PAWS
branding. This study also required an online database for data collection for survey and
prototype data. SPSS software was needed for data analysis, coding, and presentation of
results. Access to mobile devices was needed for testing. A set of 25 x $10.00 Amazon
gift cards were needed for requested SME participation rewards.
Summary
An overview of the research methodology was provided in this chapter. Utilizing
a mixed method approach, quantitative and qualitative data was used to develop, validate,
test, and collect research data. This research answered the following research questions:
The main Research Question (RQ) that this study addressed was: What
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning system combination can be used to empirically
assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails on
mobile devices?
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RQ1: What are the SMEs’ validated top signs of phishing in emails that are
considered the most critical threats to users?
RQ2: What SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings are most
valid to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails?
RQ3: What are the SMEs’ validated tasks for the measures of: (a) ability to
notice, and (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails?
RQ4: What is the SMEs’ validated maximum time for users’ ability to notice
signs of phishing in emails?
RQ5: What validation and testing procedures should be considered in order to
deliver a mobile app phishing alert and warning system prototype?
RQ6a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
RQ6b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ time to
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
RQ6c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
RQ7a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) age, (b)
gender, (c) experience with phishing awareness training, and (d) attention
span?
RQ7b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users time to
notice phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) gender, (c)
experience with phishing awareness training, as well as (d) attention span.?
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RQ7c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) age,
(b) gender, (c) prior phishing awareness training, as well as (d) attention
span?
The RQs were addressed over three phases using developmental design,
qualitative, and quantitative methods to construct and validate the PAWS mobile app.
Phase one collected SMEs feedback, utilizing Delphi methodology towards the top signs
of phishing in emails, SMEs chosen audio/visual/haptic warnings, as well as SMEs
opinion on ability to notice, time to notice, and ability to notice signs of phishing in
emails. Phase two encompassed the development and testing of the PAWS mobile app
prototype utilizing findings from Phase one and pilot testing. Phase three included the
study itself with the participants. Data collected included demographic information,
attention span scores, data towards ability to notice, time to notice signs, and ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails with and without audio, visual, as well as haptic alerts
and warnings on the participants.
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Chapter 4
Results
Overview
This chapter presents the results of the data collection and analysis from this
research study. The main goal was to determine an audio/visual/haptic alert and warning
system combination could be used to empirically assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and
(b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails on mobile devices. For Phase I, results were
presented from a one-round Delphi survey using a panel of 32 cybersecurity experts. The
SMEs validated the top signs of phishing in emails, as well as: audio/visual/haptic
warnings to pair with the emails. Phase I also identified SME opinion regarding ability to
notice, time to notice, and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails that were then used
towards development of the PAWS mobile app. Phase II utilized SME results from the
SME survey, development, coding, and user testing of the PAWS mobile app prototype,
as well as qualitative and quantitative feedback from pilot testers. The PAWS Mobile
App is a custom, mobile application available on the Apple App Store, and Google Play
Store. Phase III results are presented from the PAWS mobile app study with 205
participants utilizing ANOVA, ANCOVA, and frequency analysis of participant
interaction.
Phase I – SME Survey Feedback and Findings
RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 were answered through s survey instrument during the
first phase of this research study. Invitation emails to participate in the Subject Matter
Experts (SMEs) survey were sent to 45 cybersecurity experts with a goal of 25
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respondents. An SME panel of 32 cybersecurity experts were surveyed in one Delphi
Method (Rahim & Lichvar, 2014) cycle with a 71.1% response rate, meeting consensus
on the survey questions. Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics of the 32 respondents.
Cybersecurity and information security experts included current college professors with
classroom and industry experience (40.63%) and current cybersecurity industry
professionals (59.39%). Industry professionals included C-level executive managers
(9.37%), senior managers (18.74%), middle managers (9.38%) security analysts (9.38%),
and other cybersecurity positions (12.50%). Over 56% of the respondents had over 10
years of cybersecurity or information security industry experience followed by 28% at
five to 10 years of experience. SMEs with three to five years of experience (3.13%), one
to three years of experience (6.25%), and one year or less (6.25%) also participated in the
SME survey. Descriptive statistics of the SMEs are shown in Table 9.
Table 9
Descriptive Statistics of SMEs (N=32)
Demographic Item
Current Position:
Owner/Executive/C-Level
Senior Management
Middle Management
IT Security Analyst
Professor
Other
Private Practice
IT Senior Auditor
IT Security Staff
Cybersecurity Investigator
Experience in Information Security:
1 Year or Less
1-3 Years
3-5 Years
5-10 Years
10 Years or More

N

%

3
6
3
3
13
4
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)

9.37%
18.74%
9.38%
9.38%
40.63%
12.50%

2
2
1
9
18

6.25%
6.25%
3.13%
28.13%
56.25%
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Phase I - RQ1
To answer the research question: What are the SMEs’ validated top signs of
phishing in emails that are considered the most critical threats to users, SMEs ranked
what they felt the top signs of phishing were in the SME survey. The SMEs’ top signs of
phishing in emails that they consider the most critical threats to users are shown in Table
10. All 32 of the SMEs ranked the top signs of phishing in emails. Frequency analysis
was used to determine the highest frequency of ranking among the 32 SMEs. Sense of
Urgency was the top sign of phishing (11.32%), followed by requiring action from the
recipient (11.22%), ranking third highest was request for information from the recipient
(8.87%), followed by misspelling and grammar issues in fourth rank (8.54%), and request
to click on links as the number five sign of phishing in emails (8.34%).
Table 10
SME Top Five Signs of Phishing in Emails – Ranked (N=32)
Survey Question
Rank Signs of Phishing:
Sense of Urgency
Requiring Action
Request for Information
Misspelling and Grammar
Request to Click on Links

Rank

%

1
2
3
4
5

11.32%
11.22%
8.87%
8.53%
8.34%

Phase I - RQ2
To answer the research question: What SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic alerts
and warnings are most valid to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails, SMEs voted
on their preferred pairings in the SME survey. The SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic
warning alerts to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails were determined through
SME survey answers. Each question was represented in a companion PowerPoint
presentation. An example PowerPoint slide for the sign of phishing – requiring action
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from the email recipient, is shown in Figure 24. Each sign of phishing had a
corresponding figure for SMEs’ voting of their most preferred icon in the survey. Table
11 illustrates frequency analysis performed toward SME consensus on visual icons for
the PAWS mobile app.
Figure 24
SME Survey Question 10

Table 11
SME Rank of Icon Matching to Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32)
Survey Question
Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Urgency:
Purple Alarm with Yellow Lines
Red Alarm
Purple Stopwatch

N

%

15
16
1

46.88%
50.00%
3.12%

Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Requiring
Action:
Running Person
Red and White X
Paper List

14
11
7

43.75%
34.38%
21.87%
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Table 11
SME Rank of Icon Matching to Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32) – (cont.)
Survey Question
Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Request for
Information:
Purple Icon and “i”
Red Button with “i”
Purple Arrow Over Text Box

N

%

12
17
3

37.50%
53.13%
9.37%

Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Misspelling
and Grammar Issues:
Purple and Yellow “Aa”
Red and Black Circle “Aa”
Purple Pencil with “x”

6
11
15

18.74%
34.38%
46.88%

Which Icon Best Represents the Sign of Phishing: Request to
click on Links:
Purple Link
White Link on Red Background
Purple Down Arrow

7
21
4

21.88%
65.63%
12.49%

SME pairing of visual icons for the top signs of phishing in emails resulted in
46.88% of SMEs choosing a red alarm as the best representation of the sign of phishing
sense of urgency. Requiring action resulted in a running person icon as the chosen match
from SMEs (43.75%). SME pairings for request for information was a red button “i” with
17 votes (53.13%). SMEs decided misspelling and grammar issues should be represented
as a purple pencil with an “x” with 46.88% of SME votes. Request to click on links was
determined to be paired with a white link on a red background with 21 SME votes
(65.63%). Figure 25 illustrates the final icons paired with the top five signs of phishing in
emails that were used in the PAWS Mobile App.
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Figure 25
SME Visual Icon Matching to Top Signs of Phishing in Emails

SMEs ranking of the audio and haptic pairings as shown in Table 12 resulted in
the consensus that the audio alerts would be most effective as a female voice over alert,
receiving 34.38% of the SME consensus. Other audio choices were stock mobile device
sounds (iPhone, Android alerts) (28.13%), household alert sounds (fire alarms,
microwave sounds) (18.75%), and automobile alert sounds (seatbelt alerts, tire pressure
warnings, check engine alerts) (18.75%). The SMEs panel also determined that
shaking/vibration alerts should happen immediately upon the recipient seeing the
simulated email on the mobile screen with SME consensus at 38.71%. Other haptic
presentation choices included one second after the simulated email appears (29.03%),
two seconds after the simulated email appears (16.13%), and three seconds after the
simulated email appears (16.13%). Female voice over audible warnings, as well as
haptic/vibration upon participants viewing simulated emails were used for the PAWS
mobile app.
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Table 12
SME Rank of Audio and Haptic Matching to Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32)
Survey Question
Which Audio Alert Group Would Be the Most Effective in
Alerting Participants to Signs of Phishing in Email:
Stock Mobile Device Notification Sounds
Household Alert Sounds (Fire alarm, Microwave sounds)
Automobile Alert Sounds (Seatbelt ding)
Voice Over Description of The Sign of Phishing

N

%

9
6
6
11

28.13%
18.75%
18.75%
34.38%

Haptic/Shaking Alerts Will Be Presented to The Participants.
When Should the Mobile Device Shake Upon an Email
Appearing on The Screen:
Immediately as The Email Appears
One Second After the Email Appears
Two Seconds After the Email Appears
Three Seconds After the Email Appears

12
9
5
5

38.71%
29.03%
16.13%
16.13%

Phase I - RQ3
The SMEs’ validated tasks for the measures of: (a) ability to notice, and (b) time
to notice signs of phishing in emails was answered by SME survey questions. The SMEs’
validated tasks for users’ demographic indicators of ability to notice signs of phishing in
emails are illustrated in Table 13. The highest rank of ability to notice include the email
recipient’s experience with phishing training (90.63%), followed by the email recipient’s
experience with being phished (84.38%), experience reading emails (75%), attention span
(59.38%), age (56.25%), native language spoken (46.88%), clicking “Legitimate” or
“Phishing” buttons (34.38%), and gender (3.13%). SME consensus answers were
integrated into the development of PAWS mobile app demographic questions to analyze
the effects of age, gender, experience with phishing training, and attention span.
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Table 13
SME Rank of Determining Factors for The Ability to Notice Top Signs of Phishing in
Emails (N=32)
Survey Question
N
%
What Determines a Recipient’s Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in
Emails:
Ability to Click “Legitimate “or “Phishing”
11 34.38%
Age
18 56.25%
Gender
1
3.13%
Native Language Spoken
15 46.88%
Attention Span
19 59.38%
Experience with Emails
24 75.00%
Experience with Phishing Training
29 90.63%
Past Experience with Being Phished
27 84.38%
SMEs determined that participant’s ability to notice top signs of phishing they
saw in emails is the key indicator of ability to notice signs of phishing in emails with a
consensus of 90.32% as shown in Table 14. Ability to correctly click legitimate or
phishing buttons (41.94%), and the time it takes to click legitimate or phishing buttons
(38.71%) were also measured towards the ability to notice signs of phishing in emails.
Table 13 illustrates the SME tasks that further determine a user’s ability to notice signs of
phishing in emails. The SMEs indicated the recipient of the email needs the ability to
notice what signs of phishing they saw in the email, followed (in importance) by the time
it takes to click legitimate or phishing buttons.
Table 14
SME Rank of Tasks for The Ability to Notice Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32)
Survey Question
What Are Some Tasks That Determine a Recipient’s Ability to
Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails:
The ability to correctly to Click “Legitimate “or “Phishing”
Time it Takes to Click “Legitimate “or “Phishing” Buttons
The Ability to Identify What Signs of Phishing They Saw

N

12
13
28

%

38.71%
41.94%
90.32%
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Phase I - RQ 4
SMEs’ validated maximum time for users’ ability to notice signs of phishing in
emails was answered by SME survey question. As illustrated by Table 15, the SMEs
indicate 25 seconds (28.13%) is the maximum time to lapse before it is determined the
email recipient did not notice signs of phishing in the email. Other SME responses
included 15 seconds (15.63%), more than 90 seconds (12.50%), and 60 seconds
(18.75%).
Table 15
SME Rank of Maximum Time to Notice Top Signs of Phishing in Emails (N=32)
Survey Question
What Is the Maximum Time to Lapse Before It Is Determined the
Recipient Did Not Notice Signs of Phishing in the Emails:
5 Seconds
15 Seconds
25 Seconds
35 Seconds
45 Seconds
55 Seconds
60 Seconds
65 Seconds
70 Seconds
75 Seconds
80 Seconds
85 Seconds
More Than 90 Seconds

N

2
5
9
6
2
0
3
0
0
0
1
0
4

%

6.25%
15.63%
28.13%
18.75%
6.25%
0.0%
9.38%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
3.13%
0.0%
12.50%

Phase II - PAWS Mobile App Development
Phase II included the development of PAWS, the mobile prototype and study
application. SME consensus on audio, visual, haptic feedback, top signs of phishing,
ability to notice signs of phishing measures, time to notice measures, ability to notice
signs of phishing in email measures, and order of appearance of simulated emails were
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used. Development of the application involved programming two factor authentications
to ensure participant validity and uniqueness. The initial login screen shown in Figure 26.
Figure 26
PAWS Mobile App Screen – Login Screen Example

Demographic questions, and attention span questions were asked of the
participants and reviewed by the NSU IRB board. Simulated emails for the PAWS test
were programmed and organized based on SME consensus. The PAWS mobile app was
organized into four parts for the participants. Demographic Survey, Attention Span Test,
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PAWS Test, and Post- PAWS survey. The PAWS mobile app four sections were
presented to the participants as shown in Figure 27.
Figure 27
PAWS Mobile App Screen – Four Sections Screen Example

Phase II - RQ5
The Phase I SMEs survey, as well as a pilot test of the PAWS mobile app was
utilized to answer the research question: What validation and testing procedures should
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be considered to deliver a mobile app phishing alert and warning system. Table 16 further
identifies SMEs feedback towards an audio/visual/haptic alert and warning system
combination can be used to empirically assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and (b) time to
notice signs of phishing in emails. SMEs feedback indicated the four email alert and
warning groups: no alerts or warnings (NAVH), audio and visual alerts and warnings
(AV), haptic alerts and warnings (H), and audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings (AVH),
should be presented in a specific manner to alleviate participant habituation, and fatigue.
It was determined the top five signs of phishing should be shown for each alert and
warning group. This resulted in 20 simulated email screens for the alert and warning
system. Combined with feedback regarding the top signs of phishing, audio/visual/haptic
alerts and warnings, constructs for an audio/visual/haptic phishing alert and warning
system were created.
Table 16
SME Rank of Presentation Order of Alerts and Warnings to The Top Signs of Phishing in
Emails (N=32)
Survey Question
How Should Emails Without Audio, Visual, or Haptic Alerts and
Warnings be Presented:
Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-10 Order
Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-5 Order
Show the Top 5 First, and 6-10 after AVH Warnings are Presented
How Should Emails with Haptic Alerts and Warnings Be Presented:
Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-10 Order
Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing in Randomized Order
Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-5 Order
Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in Randomized Order

N

%

7
20
5

21.88%
62.50%
15.63%

5
4
17
6

15.63%
12.50%
53.13%
18.75%
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Table 16
SME Rank of Presentation Order of Alerts and Warnings to The Top Signs of Phishing in
Emails (N=32) – (cont.)
Survey Question
How Should Emails with Audio and Visual Alerts and Warnings Be
Presented:
Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-10 Order
Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing in Randomized Order
Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-5 Order
Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in Randomized Order
How Should Emails with Audio/visual/haptic Alerts and Warnings Be
Presented:
Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-10 Order
Show the Top 10 Signs of Phishing in Randomized Order
Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in 1-5 Order
Show the Top 5 Signs of Phishing Emails in Randomized Order

N

%

9
5
12
6

28.13%
15.63%
37.50%
18.75%

6
9
13
4

18.75%
28.13%
40.63%
12.50%

Phase II - PAWS Development and Pilot Testing
As previously shown, randomization of emails by alert group and by email length
were considered while coding and programing the PAWS mobile app prototype. All
participants saw the same, randomized order of PAWS screens. The top five signs of
phishing were represented by signs one through five being shown to the participant in a
randomized order for the group NAVH (no audio, visual, or haptic alerts and warnings),
followed by randomization of the other three alert and warning groups (totaling 15
simulated email screens) for AV (audio/visual alerts and warnings), H (haptic alerts and
warnings), and AVH (audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings).
Qualitative and quantitative measures were used to test the prototype. Functions
and effectiveness were measured with binary scores (Sauro & Lewis, 2012). Backend
database data recording accuracy was verified by in-person user testing observation. This
method was used to ensure accuracy of the database recording of how long the participant
took to click “Phishing” or “Legitimate” in seconds matched the actual action by the
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participant. User testing observation was also utilized to verify database accuracy when
participants were clicking what sign of phishing they saw on the simulated email screen.
Several issues were documented, corrected, and retested during Phase II of the
study. Audible feedback to the researcher was used during the testing phase as an issue
tracking mechanism (Rubin & Chisnell, 2008). Primarily, several signs of phishing were
able to be clicked on the “what signs of phishing did you notice” screen. The issue was
corrected to allow only one click and retested. User testing also indicated simulated
phishing emails screens text was too small. All screens were redesigned with larger text
to increase legibility. User testing also revealed a “Back” button was available allowing
participants to review the last email viewed. This was removed to rely on participant
memory to “match” the sign of phishing they believed they saw with the choices of signs
of phishing. Additionally, visual icons for both the AV and AVH groups were appearing
at the same time as the simulated email screen. This feature was reprogrammed to appear
after the email was displayed for one second for the icon to look like an alert rather than
part of the email. Figure 28 is shown with a visual icon, and short text version of the
spelling and grammar issues sign of phishing. Participants were asked to click
“Legitimate” or “Phishing” upon seeing each simulated email, and then choose what sign
of phishing they saw if “Phishing” was clicked. Figure 29 is shown with the final design
after user testing and additional corrective programming and adjustment. Final designs
for all groups (NAVH, AV, H, & AVH) included audio sounds for all AV and AVH
signs of phishing upon opening of the simulated email screen. H and AVH groups
included haptic vibration when the simulated email screen appeared.
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A Post-PAWS survey was added as the fourth part of the PAWS test to increase
validity and reduce errors for individual participation. Participants were asked if their
mobile device shook, made any audible sounds, and if they experienced any delays
(phone calls, notifications) while taking the PAWS test. This information could be
analyzed for individual results to explain potential outliers and skewed data. A free-form
text box was also added as the last participant question for the participants to add any
questions or concerns they might have had. This also helped researcher feedback in realtime as the mobile app was being delivered to the participants.
Figure 28
PAWS Mobile App Screen – AVH Example
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Phase III – PAWS Mobile App Delivery
Phase III included the application study of PAWS with participants. Data
collection occurred from June 1, 2020 to June 24, 2020. The participants were personal
and professional contacts of the and participants recruited through LinkedIn social media
posts. A total of 214 participants downloaded the PAWS Mobile App and participated in
the study.
Phase III – Pre-Analysis Data Screening
There were 214 total participants for this study. Eight participants did not
complete the study and were removed from the final participant data list. SPSS
Statistics™ version 25 was used to conduct analysis on the PAWS Mobile App
participants answers. Mahalanobis Distance procedure (Mertler & Reinhart, 2017)
determined one multivariate outlier with value 130.78. This outlier was removed from
further analysis. The final sample size for this study was 205.
Phase III – Participant Demographics Characteristics
The 205 participants included several demographic areas. Demographic
information is shown on Table 17. There were six age groups for the study. Group 1 (1820) included 11.2% of the participants with a value of 23 participants. Group 2 (21-29)
was 26.8%, Group 3 (30-39) was 21.5% with 44 participants. Group 4 (40-49) was
20.5%, Group 5 (50-59) was 12.7%. Group 6 (60 and older) included 7.3% of the study
population. Gender was almost evenly distributed with 100 female participants, 101 male
participants, and four participants that chose not to answer the gender demographic
question. Experience with phishing training was also asked in the demographic question
set. Participants that had experience training included 49.3% of the participants, 42.9%
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did not have prior phishing training, 6.8% were not sure if they have had prior phishing
training, and 1.0% preferred to not answer the question. Attention span scores were also
recorded from the attention span portion of the PAWS study.
Table 17
Descriptive Statistics of PAWS Participants (N=205)
Demographic Item
Age Group:
1. 18-20
2. 21-29
3. 30-39
4. 40-49
5. 50-59
6. 60+
Gender:
1. Female
2. Male
3. Prefer to not answer
Experience with Phishing Awareness Training:
1. Yes
2. No
3. Not Sure
4. Prefer to not answer
Attention Span Score:
1. 3,7,9
2. 10
3. 11
4. 12
5. 13
6. 14
7. 15
8. 16
9. 17
10. 18
11. 19
12. 20
13. 21
14. 22
15. 23
16. 24
17. 25
18. 26

N

%

23
55
44
42
26
15

11.2%
26.8%
21.5%
20.5%
12.7%
7.3%

100
101
4

48.8%
49.3%
2.0%

101
88
14
2

49.3%
42.9%
6.8%
1.0%

(3)
2
8
5
10
17
18
21
16
23
19
11
18
13
6
8
3
4

1.5%
1.0%
3.9%
2.4%
4.9%
8.3%
8.8%
10.2%
7.8%
11.2%
9.3%
5.4%
8.8%
6.3%
2.9%
3.9%
1.5%
2.0%
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Phase III - RQ6a
To answer if any statistically significant mean differences exist among users’
ability to notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS, Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) was used to test for significant differences between groups. The results of the
one-way ANOVA showed there were significant differences among all PAWS groups for
ATN, TTN, and ATNS. ATN (F(3,816) = 7.53, p <0.001), TTN (F(3,816) = 6.39, p
<0.001), and ATNS (F(3,816) = 115.7, p <0.001). The p-values of the F-test were less
than .05 level of significance. Results are shown in Table 18.
Table 18
ANOVA Results of Difference in PAWS Groups (N=205)
Sum of Squares
11.72
59064.31
456.51

ATN
TTN
ATNS

df
3
3
3

Mean Square
3.90
19688.10
1.31

F
7.53
6.39
115.7

Sig.
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

This section represents the results of descriptive statistics between groups for
ATN, TTN, and ATNS among all 205 participants for Group 1 (NAVH), Group 2 (AV),
Group 3 (H), and Group 4 (AVH). Descriptive statistics for RQ6 are shown in Table 19.
Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 19 and graphical representation in Figure 29
for analysis on ability to notice phishing. Group 2, AV (audio and visual alerting) was the
best performing group and shows the strongest ability to notice phishing among the
participants.
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Table 19
Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and TTNS (N=205)
DV

Group

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std.
Error

ATN

NAVH
AV
H
AVH

205
205
205
205

4.40
4.65
4.57
4.36

.826
.620
.835
.557

.058
.043
.058
.039

95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
4.29
4.51
4.57
4.74
4.45
4.68
4.28
4.44

TTN

NAVH
AV
H
AVH

205
205
205
205

112.61
90.75
95.58
105.35

51.690
59.039
52.530
58.380

3.610
4.123
3.669
4.077

105.49
82.62
88.34
97.31

119.73
98.88
102.81
113.39

ATNS

NAVH
AV
H
AVH

205
205
205
205

1.08
2.90
2.00
2.87

.928
1.388
.929
1.269

.065
.097
.065
.089

.96
2.71
1.87
2.70

1.21
3.09
2.13
3.05

Figure 29
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Phishing Emails by NAVH, AV, H, and AVH (N=205)
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Phase III - RQ6b
Statistically significant mean differences among users’ time to notice phishing in
emails with or without PAWS is represented in Figure 31. Based on mean comparisons
shown in Table 19 and graphical representation in Figure 30 for analysis on time to notice
phishing. Group 2, AV (audio and visual alerting) was the best performing group and
shows the least amount of time to notice phishing among the participants.
Figure 30
Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by NAVH, AV, H, and AVH (N=205)

Phase III - RQ6c
To discover if statistically significant mean differences among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS is represented in Figure 31.
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Based on mean comparisons shown in Table 19 and graphical representation in Figure 31
for analysis on ability to notice phishing. Group 2, AV (audio and visual alerting) was the
best performing group and shows the strongest ability to notice signs of phishing among
the participants.
Figure 31
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails by NAVH, AV, H, and AVH
(N=205)

Phase III - RQ7a, RQ7b, RQ7c
Statistically significant mean differences among users’ ability to notice, time to
notice, and ability to notice signs phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a)
age, (b) gender, (c) prior phishing awareness training, and (d) attention span are were
determined through ANCOVA analysis.
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Phase III – RQ7 – Age Group
Table 20 summarizes the results of ANCOVA to determine if there were
significant differences among all four PAWS experiments groups and age groups. The
results indicated there were significant differences among age groups (18-20, 21-29, 3039, 40-49,50-59, 60+) for ATN (ability to notice) ATN, (F(5,814) = 7.72, p <0.001).
There were also significant differences among age groups for TTN (time to notice),
(F(5,814) = 8.10, and significant differences for ATNS (ability to notice signs) (F(5,814)
= 2.20, p = 0.052).
Table 20
ANCOVA Results of Difference in ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Age Group (N=205)
Sum of Squares
19.71
121999.53
20.46

ATN
TTN
ATNS

df
5
5
5

Mean Square F
3.94
7.72
24399.90
8.10
4.09
2.20

Sig.
0.000***
0.000***
0.052*

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Descriptive statistics between groups as well as mean comparisons for age group
are represented by mean in Table 21, and Figures 32-34. The highest performing age
group among the 205 study participants was 50-59-years old with a mean score of 4.65
for ability to notice phishing, followed closely by 40-49 and 30-39 years old groups with
a mean score of 4.59. Age group two, or 21-29 years old were able to notice signs of
phishing in the least amount of time by mean (82.09), and 40-49-years old were the best
performing group for noticing signs of phishing in emails with the PAWS Mobile App by
mean (2.43), followed by 21-29 years old with a mean score of 2.32 among PAWS
experiment groups.
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Table 21
Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and TTNS by Age Group (N=205)
DV
ATN

TTN

ATNS

Age Group
18-20
21-39
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+
18-20
21-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+
18-20
21-39
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+

Mean
4.13
4.41
4.59
4.59
4.65
4.57
105.50
82.09
109.69
104.55
105.63
120.93
1.98
2.32
2.07
2.43
2.11
2.18

Std.Dev.
.773
.803
.671
.650
.650
.673
52.671
52.590
52.502
50.694
66.828
61.297
1.334
1.487
1.294
1.369
1.238
1.295

Std. Error
.081
.054
.051
.050
.064
.087
94.59
75.10
101.88
96.83
92.64
105.10
.139
.100
.098
.106
.121
.167

Figure 32
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Phishing Emails by Age Group (N=205)
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Figure 33
Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by Age Group (N=205)

Figure 34
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails by Age Group (N=205)
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Phase III – RQ7 – By Gender Group
Table 22 summarizes the results of ANCOVA to determine if there were
significant differences among all four PAWS experiment groups and gender. The results
indicated there were no significant differences among gender groups (female, male, and
choose to not answer) for ATN (ability to notice), (F(2,817) = 1.957, p =0.142).
Significant differences were shown for TTN (time to notice), (F(2,817) = 3.970, p
=0.019), and no significant differences for ATNS (ability to notice signs) by gender
(F(2,817) = 1.597, p =0.203).
Table 22
ANCOVA Results of Difference in ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Gender Group (N=205)
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square F
Sig.
ATN
2.074
2
1.037
1.957 0.142
TTN
24768.196
2
12384.098
3.970 0.019*
ATNS
5.957
2
2.979
1.597 0.203
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Descriptive statistics between groups as well as mean comparisons for gender
group are represented by mean in Table 23, and Figures 35-37. Ability to notice phishing
mean scores were female at 4.45, male at 4.54 and N/A at 4.63 with no significant
statistical significance. Mean analysis for time to notice phishing indicated the four
participants that chose to not answer the gender identification question were able to
notice signs of phishing in less time among the gender groups. Ability to notice signs of
phishing in emails analysis among gender groups indicated female mean scores at 2.24,
male at 2.16 and N/A at 2.75 with no significant statistical significance among PAWS
experiment groups.
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Table 23
Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Gender Group (N=205)
DV
ATN

TTN

ATNS

Gender
Female
Male
N/A
Female
Male
N/A
Female
Male
N/A

Mean
4.45
4.54
4.63
99.61
103.94
65.19
2.24
2.16
2.75

Std.Dev.
.764
.698
.500
54.654
57.743
29.492
1.361
1.343
1.949

Std. Error
.038
.035
.125
2.733
2.873
7.373
.068
.067
.487

Figure 35
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Phishing Emails by Gender Group (N=205)
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Figure 36
Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by Gender Group (N=205)

Figure 37
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails by Gender Group (N=205)
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Phase III – RQ7 – By Prior Experience with Phishing Training Group (N=205)
Table 24 summarizes the results of ANCOVA to determine if there were
significant differences among all four PAWS experiment groups and prior phishing
training among the participants. and The results indicated there were significant
differences among phishing training groups (prior training, no prior training, not sure if
training was received, and choose to not answer) for ATN (ability to notice), (F(3,816) =
8.319, p <0.001), no significant differences for TTN (time to notice), (F(3,816) = 1.517,
p = 0.209), and significant differences for ATNS (ability to notice signs) by phishing
training group (F(3,816) = 4.925, p = 0.002).
Table 24
ANCOVA Results of Difference of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Prior Experience with
Phishing Training Group (N=205)

ATN
TTN
ATNS

Sum of Squares
12.908
14275.368
27.203

df
3
3
3

Mean Square F
Sig.
4.303
8.319 0.000***
4758.456
1.517 0.209
9.068
4.925 0.002**

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Descriptive statistics between groups as well as mean comparisons for prior
phishing training group are represented by mean in Table 25, and Figures 38-40.
Participants with prior phishing training totaled a mean score of 4.41 and those without
prior phishing training at 4.63 indicating phishing training made a minimal difference on
noticing phishing emails among the 205 participants. Mean scores for time to notice
phishing were 98.87 for those with training, 103.82 for those without training, and 105.00
and 68.25 for those not sure if they have had phishing training in the past, and those
choosing not to answer among PAWS experiment groups.
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Table 25
Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Prior Experience with Phishing
Training Group (N=205)
DV
ATN

Training
Training
No training
Not sure
No answer

Mean
4.41
4.63
4.23
4.63

Std.Dev.
.788
.604
.853
.744

Std. Error
.039
.032
.114
.263

TTN

Training
No training
Not sure
No answer

98.78
103.82
105.00
68.25

60.347
48.818
67.183
30.946

.067
.071
.192
10.941

ATNS

Training
No training
Not sure
No answer

2.08
2.35
2.13
3.50

1.355
1.333
1.440
1.852

.067
.071
.192
.655

Figure 38
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Phishing Emails by Prior Experience with Phishing
Training Group (N=205)
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Figure 39
Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by Prior Experience with Phishing
Training Group (N=205)

Figure 40
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails by Prior Experience with
Phishing Training Group (N=205)

109

Phase III – RQ7 – By Attention Span Score Group (N=205)
Table 26 summarizes the results of ANCOVA to determine if there were
significant differences among all four PAWS experiment groups and attention span
scores among the participants. The results showed there were significant differences
among attention span scores among the participants for ATN (ability to notice),
(F(19,800) = 2.038, p <0.006). There were significant differences for TTN (time to
notice), (F(19,800) = 3.456, p <0.001), and no significant differences for ATNS (ability
to notice signs) by attention span score (F(19,800) = 0.714, p =0.807.
Table 26
ANCOVA Results of Difference of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Attention Span Score Group
(N=205)
Sum of Squares
20.081
195196.490
25.509

ATN
TTN
ATNS

df
19
19
19

Mean Square F
Sig.
1.057
2.038 0.006**
10273.499
3.456 0.000***
1.343
0.714 0.807

* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Descriptive statistics between groups as well as mean comparisons for attention
span score are represented by mean in Table 27, and Figures 41-43. Among PAWS
experiment groups. Attention span score of nine (high-attention span) with a mean score
of 5.0 were able to notice the most phishing emails among the 205 participants and were
also able to notice phishing in less time than the other attention span score groups.
Attention span score nine group also noticed the most signs of phishing among all PAWS
experiment groups.
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Table 27
Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Attention Span Score Group (N=205)
DV
ATN

TTN

Attn. Score
3
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
3
7
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Mean
4.25
4.25
5.00
4.75
4.84
4.70
4.53
4.57
4.32
4.50
4.69
4.55
4.55
4.30
4.49
4.37
4.42
4.13
4.33
4.38
108.00
83.00
44.75
78.50
80.09
107.05
81.05
92.78
115.38
110.46
92.50
128.41
98.88
117.00
98.28
87.10
94.46
77.72
111.50
85.75

Std.Dev.
.500
.957
.000
.463
.369
.470
.716
.698
.819
.768
.531
.581
.737
.795
.787
.768
.717
.942
.888
.957
25.742
11.195
12.659
28.046
35.572
39.046
43.242
30.533
74.867
61.761
45.161
67.425
57.598
68.737
56.445
41.674
48.704
37.957
57.205
22.413

Std. Error
.250
.479
.000
.164
.065
.105
.113
.085
.097
.084
.066
.061
.085
.120
.093
.106
.146
.166
.256
.239
12.871
5.598
6.329
9.916
6.288
8.731
6.837
3.703
8.823
6.739
5.645
7.029
6.607
10.363
6.652
5.779
9.942
6.710
16.514
5.603
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Table 27
Descriptive Statistics of ATN, TTN, and ATNS by Attention Span Score Group (N=205) –
(cont.)
DV
Attn. Score
Mean
Std.Dev.
Std. Error
ATNS
3
2.00
.816
.408
7
2.50
1.732
.866
9
3.00
1.414
.707
10
2.38
1.685
.596
11
2.41
1.500
.265
12
2.40
1.273
.285
13
2.13
1.488
.235
14
2.04
1.215
.147
15
2.24
1.369
.161
16
2.19
1.322
.144
17
2.36
1.289
.161
18
2.23
1.384
.144
19
2.33
1.341
.154
20
1.64
1.163
.175
21
2.24
1.429
.168
22
2.29
1.499
.208
23
2.13
1.296
.265
24
2.22
1.601
.283
25
2.42
1.621
.468
26
2.25
1.291
.323
Figure 41
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Phishing Emails by Attention Span Score Group
(N=205)

112
Figure 42
Mean Score for Time to Notice Phishing in Emails by Attention Span Score Group
(N=205)

Figure 43
Mean Score for Ability to Notice Signs of Phishing in Emails by Attention Span Score
Group (N=205)
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Phase III – RQ6, RQ7 – Additional Analysis
Additional analysis of all PAWS simulated email screens was also performed. As
noted previously, 20 simulated emails were presented to the participants via mobile app
downloaded to their personal mobile device. The simulated screens were presented in
randomized group order (NAVH, AV, H, & AVH) and random email length by group.
Data collected on individual participant performance included ability to notice phishing
(clicking “Phishing” or “Legitimate”), time to notice phishing (time in seconds to click
“Legitimate” or “Phishing”), and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails (clicking
what sign of phishing the participant saw) for each of the 20 simulated email screens.
Figure 44 illustrates the indication of the AV (audio and visual alerting) group
was the best-performing group of the PAWS groups for ability to notice, time to notice,
and ability to notice signs of phishing in emails. The number of simulated emails screens
notices as phishing by the participants was 954 for the AV group, 902 for NAVH, 936 for
H, and 894 for AVH group. Time to notice phishing for the AV group was an average of
91 seconds, with NAVH averaging 113 seconds, H averaging 96 seconds, and AVH at
105 seconds. Ability to notice signs of phishing in emails were 594 for the AV group,
222 for NAVH, 410 for H, and 589 for AVH groups.
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Figure 44
Sums and Averages for ATN, TTN, and ATNS for All Participants (N=205)

Table 28 itemizes each PAWS simulated email screen by correct clicks by the
participant, number of TTN below the SME agreed time of 25 seconds for maximum
time to notice phishing in emails, and correct clicks by the participant towards
identification of signs of phishing in the specified simulated email screen. Figure 45
illustrates Table 28.
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Table 28
Sums and Averages for PAWS Simulated Email Screens by Participant (N=205)
PAWS Screen Version
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

UrgencyShort
ActionLong
InfoMed
Spelling1
LinksShort
UrgencyLong
Action1
InfoLong
SpellingShort
LinksMed
Urgency1
ActionMed
InfoShort
SpellingMed
LinkLong
UrgencyMed
ActionShort
Info1
SpellingLong
UrgencyShort

Group

ATN Clicks

TTN < = 25

ATNS

NAVH
NAVH
NAVH
NAVH
NAVH
AVH
H
AV
AVH
H
AV
AVH
H
AV
AVH
H
AV
AVH
H
AV

200
115
170
199
178
86
198
203
203
169
195
199
187
199
201
183
178
203
199
179

119
107
125
191
151
76
174
146
192
152
191
134
184
174
138
167
149
192
138
163

27
18
36
98
43
50
48
135
149
70
139
106
161
108
100
11
92
149
120
120
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Figure 45
Sum and Averages for PAWS Simulated Email Screens by Participant (n=205)

Summary
The results and data collection were described in this chapter. Phase I results from
the SME survey. SMEs voted on each question thus answering RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and
RQ4. Answers from the survey validated constructs for the PAWS Mobile App. Phase II
developed, designed, and tested the PAWS Mobile App. Phase III included the PAWS
Mobile App study with participants.
The results of Phase I indicated the top signs of phishing, according to SMEs for
this study were: sense of urgency, requiring action from the recipient, request for
information from the recipient, misspelling and grammar issues in the email, and request
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for the recipient to click on links. Findings from the SMEs survey also included visual
icon matching for each sign of phishing, and a voice over warning announcing each sign
of phishing. SMEs also indicated the mobile device should shake/vibrate upon seeing a
phishing email to alert the recipient of a phishing email.
Phase II successfully built the PAWS Mobile App from combining constructs
determined by the SMEs in Phase I, and qualitative and quantitative testing, as well as
pilot testing and user observation testing. Two rounds of testing were completed to ensure
validity and accuracy of the study, and to ensure performance of the mobile app on both
the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store.
Phase III encompassed all of the PAWS Mobile App results based on data from
205 participants. Participants downloaded the PAWS Mobile App to their personal
mobile devices and participated in demographic questions, an attention span test, 20
simulated phishing email screens, and post-PAWS questions. The results from the study
indicated visual alerts and audible warnings help participants notice phishing emails,
assist the participant in lessening the time it takes to notice phishing in emails, and to
notice specific signs of phishing more accurately in emails.
Statistically significant demographic results among the study participants
indicated, 50-59 years old (12.7% of the participants) noticed more signs of phishing than
other age groups, 21-29 years old (26.8%) of the participants noticed signs of phishing in
the least amount of time. The female gender group (48.8% of the participants) and those
choosing not to answer gender (2.0% of the participants) noticed phishing emails faster
among gender groups. Participants without prior phishing training (42.9% of the
participants) were able to identify more phishing emails than those without, unsure or
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choosing not to answer if they have received prior training. Participants with high
attention span scores among the 205 participants noticed signs of phishing in emails and
in less time than those with lower attention span scores.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
Alerts and warnings help people identify phishing emails sooner than if not
presented with alerts and warnings. Audio alerts and visual warnings help participants
notice what sign of phishing they saw in an email than without audio and visual alerts and
warnings. Additionally, the number of participants clicking “Phishing” in under 25
seconds was higher among the PAWS alert and warning groups than without.
The main goal of this study was achieved by creating a phishing alert and warning
system that utilizes audio/visual/haptic alerts to assess participants’ ability to notice
phishing emails and assess the time to notice the emails. The alert and warning system
successfully measured both ability and time to notice phishing emails with favorable data
indicating alerts and warnings helped participants both notice phishing and reduce the
time it takes to notice phishing emails.
Discussion
Several limitations surrounded this study. This study was delivered during the
COVID-19 pandemic. It is possible the pandemic affected the final participation numbers
as participants were not readily accessible or able to be communicated with in order to
explain the nature of the study. Increased participation for this version of the PAWS
Mobile App could have been improved. Some participants felt the intro dissertation
request looked like spam. A pre-request email could have possibly prevented this
misunderstanding. Some participants were also wary of submitting their phone number to
register as a participant of PAWS. These issues were attempted to be prevented by
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repeated text indicating the participants information will not be stored or used for any
other purpose. For future iterations of PAWS, the de-identification of data text should be
prominent in the invitational emails and on the PAWS mobile app itself.
Some simulated email screens did not perform well among all 205 participants.
Simulated email screen six, UrgencyLong with audio, visual, and haptic alerting was not
a top performing email based on the length of time participants spent viewing the email,
low click rates on “Phishing” and low click rates on identification of the sign of phishing.
This could also be linked to the possibility of simulated screen placement, as it was
number six in the screen order. This simulated email screen would have been the first
time the participants saw a visual icon, heard the voice over warning, and felt the
haptic/vibration feedback. Several participants noted post-study that they were surprised
and/or freighted by the alerts and warnings upon first hearing and seeing them. This is a
notable finding as it is possible this simulated email screen jolted participants into System
2 thinking, and all reactions were slower, and more deliberate. Another explanation of
this reaction from the participants (as it was the first time the participants heard an
audible voice and were started) is the “Oh Shoot” syndrome. The participants’ reaction is
an interesting finding as the participants found a voice-over to be a “novel” and
“unexpected” alert or warning. Analyzing the participant reaction could be an area for
future research.
Simulated email screen 16 showed promising results as the majority of participants
clicked “Phishing”, however, a low click rate of 11 for sign of phishing among the
participants indicates this simulated email did not contain enough of the elements of
urgency in the body of the email. Furthermore, this email screen was included in the
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haptic only group, therefore not assisting the participant with noticing the sign of
phishing in the email through audio or visual assistance. It is recommended that
additional analysis on the email screens for future iterations of the PAWS mobile app in
order to accommodate for the potential for simulated email screen understandability, as
well as tracking of the first email the participants “see and hear” to note if click rates are
statistically differing from other simulated email screen click rates. Additionally, a text
screen completely explaining that the PAWS Mobile App measures phishing
identification and timing among participants may be helpful. Several participants
indicated they were unsure what the app’s purpose was, or what the participant was
supposed to be performing. Several issues were noticed in this study. Potential issues
with confusion regarding why a voice was audibly saying the sign of phishing to the
participant on the first audio alert. Other possibilities include the simulated email did not
look “phishy” enough to the participant.
Implications
There are several implications for cybersecurity, social awareness, and phishing
susceptibility reduction. This study implicates phishing email alerts and warnings applied
and configured to email applications may play a significant role in the reduction of
phishing susceptibility. This study also implicates training for an organization in phishing
awareness as well as phishing training with alerts and warnings may play a significant
role in the reduction of phishing susceptibility.
Implications for Practice
Corporations could potentially reduce the severity of phishing for both corporate
and personal data loss by implementing alerts and warnings on corporate email servers.
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User phishing awareness training is also important to reduce phishing susceptibility.
Corporations could also perform deeper analysis on their demographic characteristics to
determine more high-risk groups among age group, gender, prior phishing training, and
attention span.
Implications for Research
Implications for research indicate additional discovery on what
audio/visual/haptic alerts and warning combinations could be created to further increase
ability to notice, time to notice, and ability to notice signs of phishing among users.
Deeper analysis on audio tone, frequency, voice, urgency, and character could identify
with users with differing preferences on alerting. Visual icon analysis could also be
investigated to improve visual feedback for the email recipient. Haptic vibrations could
be researched to determine if frequency and intensity could assist the user more
appropriately. Demographic studies could be performed to investigate deeper patterns
within age group, gender, effects of phishing training, and attention span.
Recommendations and Future Research
A deeper analysis on audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings for the PAWS
Mobile App should be further performed. Customization for specific groups are also
being constructed. Customization includes email, audio/visual/haptic pairings with
demographics and background in mind. An addition of artificial intelligence to the
PAWS Mobile App is also underway. Email filtering with alerts and warnings could be
helpful towards combating the issue of phishing and social engineering. Additionally,
hovering ability and link analysis could also be used for future research of the
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning technology.
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The “Oh Shoot” syndrome, or the moment a participant realized they clicked on a
phishing link can be more deeply explored as this research unexpectedly found the first
simulated phishing email (In Group 2 - AVH) with audio, visual, and haptic alerting
started participants and “slowed down” their reaction time. Those participants that
followed up with the researcher after their experience with the PAWS Mobile App
indicated they paid more attention after the first audio and visual alert and began
questioning the steps they took for the rest of the simulated emails. Additional research or
visual observation may add to this body of knowledge.
Summary
In summary, alerts and warnings help users notice phishing emails more easily,
and within less time than without alerts and warnings. This study indicates voice over
combined with a visual alert is the best combination of alert and warning.
The main research question (RQ) that this study addressed was: What
audio/visual/haptic alert and warning system combination can be used to empirically
assess users’ (a) ability to notice, and (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails on
mobile devices and included RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4:
RQ1: What are the SMEs’ validated top signs of phishing in emails that are
considered the most critical threats to users?
RQ2: What SMEs’ identified audio/visual/haptic alerts and warnings are most
valid to pair with the top signs of phishing in emails?
RQ3: What are the SMEs’ validated tasks for the measures of: (a) ability to
notice, and (b) time to notice signs of phishing in emails?
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RQ4: What is the SMEs’ validated maximum time for users’ ability to notice
signs of phishing in emails?
Phase I answered RQ1 as the top signs of phishing were identified according to
SMEs. RQ2 was answered by pairing SME choices of audio/visual/haptic alerts and
warnings with the top signs of phishing according to SMEs. RQ3 was answered as tasks
for participants to perform during the study were collected and added to the PAWS
Mobile App as data points. RQ4 was answered as 25 seconds was determined as the
SMEs maximum time for ability to notice phishing in emails.
Phase II included the construction, programming, testing, and coding of the
PAWS Mobile App and answered the following research question:
RQ5: What validation and testing procedures should be considered in order to
deliver a mobile app phishing alert and warning system prototype?
RQ5 was answered by utilizing observation testing among pilot testers to
determine data accuracy for the PAWS App. Qualitative observation and quantitative
analysis and observation were combined to ensure accuracy of PAWS participant clicks
and time (in seconds) to click “Phishing” or “Legitimate”. The PAWS Mobile App was
successfully built, validated, tested, and delivered on the Apple App Store and the Google
Play Store for participant download to their mobile device.
Phase III included the delivery and participation of the PAWS Mobile App and
answered the following research questions:
RQ6a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
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RQ6b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ time to
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
RQ6c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS?
RQ7a: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) age, (b)
gender, (c) experience with phishing awareness training, and (d) attention
span?
RQ7b: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users time to
notice phishing in emails using PAWS based on: (a) age, (b) gender, (c)
experience with phishing awareness training, as well as (d) attention span?
RQ7c: Do statistically significant mean differences exist among users’ ability to
notice signs of phishing in emails with or without PAWS based on: (a) age,
(b) gender, (c) prior phishing awareness training, as well as (d) attention
span?
RQ6a, RQ6b, and RQ6c were answered by successfully indicating differences in
PAWS groups with or without audio and visual warnings. Audio and visual warnings
assisted participants in noticing signs of phishing, lessened the time to notice phishing
among the participants, and increased the amount signs of phishing noticed.
RQ7a, RQ7b, and RQ7c were answered by indicating some statistical mean
differences among participants. Ability to notice signs of phishing was highest among the
50-59 years old age group. Time to notice phishing in emails was fast among the 21-29
years old age group. Time to notice phishing emails was faster among females and those

126
choosing not to answer the gender demographic question. Ability to notice signs of
phishing appeared stronger among those that had prior phishing training. Ability to notice
phishing was stronger among those with high attention span scores. Time to notice
phishing was faster among those with higher attention span scores as well.
Overall, this study developed a phishing alert and warning system utilizing
constructs determined by subject matter experts. The study results show statistically
significant differences among participants presented with alerts and warnings on
simulated phishing emails as compared to no alerts and warnings. Participants were able
to notice phishing emails with the assistance of alerts and warnings, notice the phishing
emails in less time, and correctly identify what sign of phishing they saw in the simulated
email with the use of PAWS Mobile App alerts and warnings.
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Appendix A
Example of SME Participant Demographic Survey – Survey Monkey and
PowerPoint Companion File Screenshots
1. Which of the following describes your current job level?
2. Owner/Executive/C Level
• Senior Management
• Middle Management
• Analyst
• Instructor/Professor
• Other
3. How many years of experience do you have in information security?
• Less than one year
• At least one year, but less than 3 years
• At least three years, but less than 5 years
• At least 5 years, but less than 10 years
• 10 years or more
4. In your opinion, how significant of an issue is phishing?
• Not at all significant
• Low significance
• Slightly significant
• Neutral
• Moderately significant
• Very significant
• Extremely significant
5. Please rank the following signs of phishing in emails
• Sense of urgency
• Requiring action
• Monetary gain
• Misspelling and grammar issues
• Greeting errors
• Signature errors
• Incorrect URL
• Request to click on links
• Request for information
• Spoofed sender or content
• Unsolicited attachment
• Threatening language
• Address mismatch
• Highly personalized
6. How long should it take a recipient of a phishing email to notice signs of phishing in
the email?
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• 5 seconds
• 15 seconds
• 25 seconds
• 35 seconds
• 45 seconds
• 55 seconds
• 60 seconds
7. What is the maximum amount of time to lapse before it is determined the recipient
did not notice signs of phishing in the email?
• 5 seconds
• 15 seconds
• 25 seconds
• 35 seconds
• 45 seconds
• 55 seconds
• 60 seconds
• 65 seconds
• 70 seconds
• 75 seconds
• 85 seconds
• More than 90 seconds
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Appendix B
Example of PAWS Participant Demographic Survey
1. Which category includes your age?
• 18-20
• 21-29
• 30-39
• 40-49
• 50-59
• 60 or older
2. Do you have at least one email account?
• Yes
• No
3. Do you use a mobile device to check your email?
• Yes
• no
4. What is your gender?
• Male
• Female
• Prefer to not answer
5. What is your primary written language?
• English
• Spanish
• Hindi
• Arabic
• Other – input field
6. How many years have you used a mobile device?
• 0-1
• 1-3
• 3-5
• 5-7
• 7-10
7. Have you participated in phishing training in the past?
• Yes
• No
• Not sure
• Prefer to not answer
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Appendix C
Example of PAWS Participant Attention Span Test
1. Do you get distracted easily by conversations taking place around you?
• Yes
• Sometimes
• No
2. Are you late for appointments often?
• Yes
• Sometimes
• No
3. How difficult is it to concentrate on a friend talking to you while your favorite
show is on?
• Difficult
• Moderately difficult
• Not difficult
4. How difficult is it for you to concentrate on what you are reading without rereading the page?
• Difficult
• Moderately difficult
• Not difficult
5. Do you have a knack for noticing details?
• Yes
• Sometimes
• No
6. Do you lose your patience easily?
• Yes
• Sometimes
• No
7. Do you interrupt people when they are talking?
• Yes
• Sometimes
• No
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Appendix D
Example of PAWS Participant Post-PAWS Test
1. Did your mobile device shake at all during the PAWS test?
• Yes
• No
2. Did you hear any sounds during the PAWS test?
• Yes
• No
3. Did you experience any delays during the PAWS test (phone calls, notifications)?
• Yes
• No
4. Do you have any questions or concerns?
• Yes
• No
• (Free-form text response)
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Appendix E
Original PAWS Prototype (TEMPLATE): Example of Email Phishing
Simulation Message without Alerts and Warnings
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Appendix F
Original PAWS Prototype (TEMPLATE): Example of Email Phishing
Simulation Message without Alerts and Warnings

141

Appendix G
Original PAWS Prototype (TEMPLATE): Example PAWS ID Screen
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Appendix H
Original PAWS Prototype (TEMPLATE): Example of Email Phishing
Simulation Message with Alerts and Warnings
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Appendix I
Example of SME Recruitment Message
SME Recruitment Letter
Dear Information Security Subject Matter Expert (SME),
I am a PhD candidate in Information Systems at the College of Engineering and
Computing of Nova Southeastern University. My dissertation is chaired by Dr. Yair Levy
and this work is part of the Levy Cylab Projects (http://CyLab.nova.edu/). My research
study is seeking to determine if audio, visual, and haptic alerting can reduce susceptibility
of phishing emails.
The experiment that I am seeking assistance with is aimed to develop an application
comprised of audio, visual, and haptic alerting. The study will be a mobile application
that participants download to their mobile device and partake in a simulated phishing test.
The test consists of various screens. The screens are designed to look like phishing
emails. Various sounds, visual icons, and shaking will occur to assist the participant in
noticing signs of phishing in emails.
I am requesting your help in a few areas of the PAWS design:
1. Your ranking of the Top Signs of Phishing in Emails
2. Your opinion regarding the most appropriate audio, visual, and haptic alerting
elements to pair with signs of phishing in emails
3. Your opinion on the appropriate time it should take for a participant to notice
signs of phishing in emails
4. Your opinion on the design of screens presented to the participant
By participating in this research study, you agree and understand that your responses are
voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no personal identifiable information will be
collected or traced back to anyone. Of course, you may stop your participation at any
time. As a token of appreciation for your security expert contribution to this research
study you will receive a $10 Amazon digital gift card to your email address upon
completing the survey instruments required to initiate this research study.
I appreciate your assistance and contribution to this research study. If you wish to receive
the findings of the study, feel free to contact me via email and I will be more than happy
to provide you with the information about the academic research publication resulting
from this study.
Please let me know if you would like to participate in my SME survey.
Best Regards,
Molly Cooper, PhD Candidate in Information Systems and Cybersecurity
Nova Southeastern University
Email: mc3300@mynsu.nova.edu
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Appendix J
Example of Participant Recruitment Message

I am a PhD candidate in Information Systems at the College of Engineering and
Computing of Nova Southeastern University. My dissertation is chaired by Dr. Yair Levy
and this work is part of the Levy Cylab Projects (http://CyLab.nova.edu/). I am seeking
participants for my dissertation study.
By participating in this research study, you agree and understand that your responses are
voluntary. All responses are anonymous and no personal identifiable information will be
collected or traced back to anyone. Of course, you may stop your participation at any
time.
If you would like to participate, please go to:
Pawstest.com to download the PAWS Test App.
Following download, the test should not take more than 20 minutes.

Best Regards,
Molly Cooper, PhD Candidate in Information Systems and Cybersecurity
Nova Southeastern University
Email: mc3300@mynsu.nova.edu
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Appendix K
Data Collection Detail
No
RQ1

RQ2

RQ3

Research
Question
What are the
SMEs’
validated top
signs of
phishing in
emails that are
considered the
most critical
threats to
users?
What SMEs’
identified
audio/visual
/haptic alerts
and warnings
are most valid
to pair with
the top signs
of phishing in
emails?

Collection
Instrument
SME
anonymous
survey

Specific Data Collection Question
or Screen
Question:
Please rank the signs of phishing
from most important to least.

Analysis
Likert Scale
Ranking
Highest percentage
of choice among
the SMEs will be
chosen for the
PAWS Mobile
App.

SME
anonymous
survey

What are the
SME
SMEs’
anonymous
validated
survey
tasks for the
measures of:
(a) ability to
notice, and (b)
time to notice
signs of
phishing in
emails?

Question:
A series of choice questions in the
SME Survey:
• The SMEs will indicate what
their preferred audio sound
for each sign of phishing in
email. 1, 2, or 3.
• The SMEs will indicate what
their preferred visual icon is
for each sign of phishing in
email. 1, 2, or 3.
• The SMEs will indicate what
their preferred haptic alert
timing is for each sign of
phishing in email. 1, 2, or 3.

Likert Scale
Ranking

Question:
(Ability) A choice of selections for
screen presentation for PAWS
Mobile App.

Likert Scale
Ranking

Highest percentage
of choice among
the SMEs will be
chosen for the
PAWS Mobile
App.

Highest percentage
of choice among
(Ability)
the SMEs will be
What determines a recipient’s ability chosen for the
to notice signs of phishing in
PAWS Mobile
emails?
App.
Time
• Age
• Gender
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•

RQ4

RQ5

RQ6a

What is the
SMEs’
validated
maximum
time for users’
ability to
notice signs of
phishing in
emails?
What
validation and
testing
procedures
should be
considered in
order to
deliver a
mobile app
phishing alert
and warning
prototype?
Are there any
statistically
significant
mean
differences
among users’

SME
anonymous
survey

PAWS
Prototype

Prior experience with
phishing training
• Attention Span
(Time) How long should it take a
recipient of a phishing email to
notice signs of phishing?
• 25 seconds
• 30 seconds
• 35 seconds
(Tasks)What are some tasks that
determine a recipient’s ability to
detect signs of phishing in emails?
• Clicking Phishing
• Not clicking anything on the
screen.
• Clicking signs of phishing
noticed
• Clicking Phishing within a
certain amount of time?
Question: What is the maximum
amount of time to lapse before it is
determined the recipient did not
notice signs of phishing in emails?
Choice 1, 2, or 3.

Evidence of completed prototype
using SME responses

Likert Scale
Ranking
Highest percentage
of choice among
the SMEs will be
chosen for the
PAWS Mobile
App.
Successful testing
of mobile app
functionality.

User testing observation
Qualitative and
quantitative user
testing analysis

PAWS
Mobile App

User selection of signs of phishing
noticed on PAWS Mobile App

ANOVA
Analysis of correct
signs of phishing
identification using
PAWS email
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ability to
notice signs of
phishing in
emails with or
without
PAWS?
RQ6b Are there any
statistically
significant
mean
differences
among users’
time to notice
signs of
phishing in
emails with or
without
PAWS?
RQ6c Are there any
statistically
significant
mean
differences
among users’
ability to
notice signs of
phishing in
emails with or
without
PAWS?
RQ7a Are there any
statistically
significant
mean
differences
among users’
ability to
notice signs of
phishing in
emails using
PAWS based
on: (a) age,
(b) gender, (c)
prior phishing
training, and

screens without
AVH compared to
screens with AV,
H, or AVH.

PAWS
Mobile App

PAWS
Mobile App

Time it takes user to click
Legitimate or Phishing on PAWS
Mobile App

Participant clicks of “what sign of
phishing did you notice” screen

ANOVA
Analysis of
recorded time to
click Legitimate or
Phishing buttons
time using PAWS
email screens
without AVH
compared to
screens with AV,
H, or AVH.
ANOVA
Analysis of “what
sign of phishing did
you notice” screen
without AVH
compared to
screens with AV,
H, or AVH.

PAWS
Mobile App

Analysis of user responses to
demographic questions and attention
span questions against PAWS user
responses to PAWS AVH compared
to screens with AV, H, or AVH.

ANCOVA
Analysis of user
responses to
demographic
questions and
attention span
questions against
PAWS user
responses to PAWS
AVH compared to
screens with AV,
H, or AVH.
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(d) attention
span.
RQ7b Are there any
statistically
significant
mean
differences
among users
time to notice
of phishing in
emails using
PAWS based
on: (a) age,
(b) gender, (c)
prior phishing
training, as
well as (d)
attention span.
RQ7c Are there any
statistically
significant
mean
differences
among users’
ability to
notice signs of
phishing in
emails with or
without
PAWS?

PAWS
Mobile App

PAWS
Mobile App

Analysis of user responses to
demographic questions and attention
span questions against PAWS user
responses to PAWS AVH compared
to screens with AV, H, or AVH.

ANCOVA

Participant clicks of “what sign of
phishing did you notice” screen

ANCOVA

Analysis of user
responses to
demographic
questions and
attention span
questions against
PAWS user
responses to PAWS
AVH compared to
screens with AV,
H, or AVH.s.

Analysis of user
responses to
demographic
questions and
attention span
questions against
PAWS user
responses to PAWS
AVH compared to
screens with AV,
H, or AVH.s.
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IRB Exemption Letter

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Institutional Review Board

MEMORANDUM

To:

Molly Cooper

From:

Ling Wang, Ph.D.,
Center Representative, Institutional Review Board

Date:

March 10, 2020

Re:

IRB #: 2020-120; Title, “An Empirical Assessment of
Audio, Visual, and Haptic Alerts and Warnings to
Mitigate Risk of Phishing Susceptibility in Emails”

I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level.
Based on the information provided, I have determined that this study is
exempt from further IRB review under 45 CFR 46.101(b) ( Exempt 2:
Interviews, surveys, focus groups, observations of public
behavior, and other similar methodologies). You may proceed with
your study as described to the IRB. As principal investigator, you must
adhere to the following requirements:
1)

CONSENT: If recruitment procedures include consent forms, they
must be obtained in such a
manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the
process affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain
detailed answers from those directly involved in the research, and have
sufficient time to consider their participation after they have been
provided this information. The subjects must be given a copy of the
signed consent document, and a copy must be placed in a secure file
separate from de-identified participant information. Record of

150
informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from
the conclusion of the study.
2)

ADVERSE EVENTS/UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS: The
principal investigator is required to notify the IRB chair and me (954262-5369 and Ling Wang, Ph.D., respectively) of any adverse
reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a result of this
study. Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury,
depression as a result of participation in the study, lifethreatening
situation, death, or loss of confidentiality/anonymity of subject.
Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is serious.

3)

AMENDMENTS: Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number
or types of subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be
approved by the IRB prior to implementation. Please be advised that
changes in a study may require further review depending on the nature
of the change. Please contact me with any questions regarding
amendments or changes to your study.

The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of
human subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (45 CFR 46) revised June 18, 1991.
Cc:

Yair Levy, Ph.D.
Ling Wang, Ph.D.

3301 College Avenue • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7796
(954) 262-0000 • 800-672-7223, ext. 5369
Email: irb@nova.edu
Web site: www.nova.edu/irb
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